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I. INTRODUCTION
With the Washington Supreme Court having recently
invalidated the statutory cap placed on awards of noneconomic
damages to tort plaintiffs1 as a violation of the state constitu-
tional right to a jury trial,2 we may expect an increasing
onslaught upon other controversial provisions of the Washing-
ton Tort Reform Act of 1986.3 In particular, the modification
of the common law doctrine of joint and several liability, which
was also accomplished by the Tort Reform Act and is codified
at section 4.22.070 of the Washington Revised Code,4 has
already become a target of plaintiffs' attorneys in tort litigation
and has also come under repeated attack by commentators in
Northwest regional law reviews.5 The need for eventual reso-
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1989).
2. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, amended, 780 P.2d 260
(1989).
3. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, §§ 100-912, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354-67 (codified
in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE (1989)).
4. Id. § 401, 1986 Wash. Laws 1357 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1989)).
5. Peck, Constitutional Challenges to the Partial Rejection and Modification of the
Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability Made by the 1986 Washington Tort
Reform Act, 62 WASH. L. REV. 681 (1986/1987) (primarily suggesting that the statute
may infringe constitutional due process); Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley,
Washington's 1986 Tort Legislation and the State Constitution: Testing the Limits, 22
GONz. L. REV. 193 (1987) (arguing that the statute violates numerous constitutional
provisions). Contra Comment, Development in the Law, The 1986 Washington Tort
[Vol. 13:433
Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986
lution of this dispute by the Washington Supreme Court seems
certain.
The legislative modification of Washington's joint and sev-
eral liability rule sought to achieve greater fairness in tort law
by ameliorating the harsh common law doctrine, which had
held each defendant responsible for the entire tort judgment
even if that defendant was found to have been only slightly at
fault.6 The legislature also hoped thereby to reduce the uncer-
tainty in tort law that had contributed to a crisis in the availa-
bility and affordability of liability insurance.7 To accomplish
its purposes, the legislature largely abandoned the archaic
common law doctrine of joint and several liability in cases
where the plaintiff is also at fault. Consistent with the adop-
tion of comparative negligence several years before, the legisla-
ture mandated that recovery of tort damages generally be
limited to that portion of damages for which each individual
defendant is found to have been responsible.
The plaintiffs' bar and other detractors of the legislation
have raised numerous challenges to this doctrinal modification,
both in court and in the legal literature, based on provisions of
the Washington Constitution.' Some of the constitutional
Reform Act: Elimination of Joint and Several Liability (RCW 4.22.070), 23
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 211, 235 (1987) (concluding that statute is constitutionally valid).
6. The legislature stated that the purposes of the reforms enacted were "to create
a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the availability
of insurance." Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354.
7. Id. Many respected commentators had concluded that the "escalating and
unpredictable growth of the liability system" bore "a direct relationship to the current
problems with the availability and affordability of liability insurance." Willard,
Troubling Trends in Our Civil Justice System and the Need for Tort Reform, 34 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 116, 117 (1987); see also STATE OF WASHINGTON, A REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE FROM THE JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY 3 (1985) (known as the Marquardt Report, after Washington Insurance
Commissioner Dick Marquardt who headed the study committee, it concluded that the
growth of tort litigation compounded problems caused by insurance industry
practices); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON
THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1977).
8. The challenges to the Washington Tort Reform Act have been premised
primarily upon the Washington State Constitution since the federal courts have rather
uniformly rejected challenges to tort reform statutes on federal constitutional grounds.
See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Boyd v.
Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989); Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414 (5th Cir.
1986); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash Disaster
at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1989) (upholding Colorado
statute abolishing joint and several liability against federal constitutional attack).
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questions raised, particularly procedural due process concerns,9
will merit careful attention when the statute is interpreted by
the courts in the context of actual cases. However, other con-
stitutional challenges, especially those based on substantive
due process' ° and equal protection or privileges and immuni-
ties,'1 ultimately resolve into mere policy critiques of the direc-
tion taken by the state legislature in restoring some balance to
the tort liability system. The wisdom of the statute, however,
is not a proper subject of judicial review; instead, the courts
must give "every reasonable presumption in favor of the con-
stitutionality of the law."' 2
To balance the legal debate, this Article suggests that the
statutory revision and partial abolition of joint and several lia-
bility was the necessary and appropriate next step in the evolu-
tion of modern tort law to a system founded upon the concept
of comparative fault among all parties. Properly understood in
its historical context and interpreted under established, rather
than innovative and unfounded, principles of constitutional
law, the modification of joint and several liability passes mus-
ter under the Washington Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Context of the Statutory Modification of the
Joint and Several Liability Rule
Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence and the
development of a tort system based on apportionment of fault,
the common law provided for joint and several liability among
all tortfeasors who bore some responsibility for an innocent
victim's injury. 3 Although this concept of liability was ini-
tially limited to cases in which defendants had acted in concert,
usually intentionally, to effect a single injury, 1 4 the rule even-
9. See Peck, supra note 5, at 690-97.
10. See id. at 682-89 (suggesting a constitutionally protected fundamental right to
recovery in tort for damages caused by wrongful conduct); Wiggins, Harnetiaux &
Whaley, supra note 5, at 211-20, 242 (advocating recognition of a quid pro quo
requirement before common law tort rules may be modified).
11. See Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 204-11, 239-41.
12. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 643, 771 P.2d 711, 715, amended,
780 P.2d 260 (1989).
13. The doctrine of joint and several liability appears to have been first recognized
in Washington in 1909. See Nelson v. Bromley, 55 Wash. 256, 104 P. 251 (1909).
14. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law
Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 235 (1987); Prosser, Joint
Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 414-21 (1937).
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tually expanded to cover multiple tortfeasors whose actions
jointly, concurrently, or successively caused injury to a
plaintiff. 15
Under this doctrine, each tortfeasor was held jointly and
severally liable for all damages that ensued. 6 A plaintiff was
permitted to obtain and enforce a judgment in the full amount
of the damages against one or all of the joint tortfeasors. 1 7
Thus, even a defendant whose role in the tortious conduct had
been relatively minor could be charged with the entire
judgment.
However, at common law there was an important excep-
tion to the rule of joint and several liability, indeed to the
plaintiff's ability to recover from any defendant at all. If the
plaintiff was found to have been contributorily negligent, that
is, culpable to any degree for his own injury, he was absolutely
barred from any recovery.' Thus, even if one or more defend-
ants had also contributed to the injury, the plaintiff's own neg-
ligence, however slight, made him ineligible to receive any
award of damages.
The rules of joint and several liability and contributory
negligence evolved together.'9 Both doctrines "grew out of the
common law concept of the unity of the cause of action; the
jury could not be permitted to apportion the damages, since
there was but one wrong.""0 This conceptual underpinning for
joint and several liability began to collapse with the decline of
the rule of contributory negligence and the advent of compara-
tive fault in tort law.
As states introduced the concept of comparative fault and
allowed partially culpable plaintiffs to recover by allocating
the fault for injuries between plaintiffs and defendants, the
premise that wrongs were inherently indivisible or that
responsibility could not rationally be apportioned among multi-
ple parties fell into disfavor. The adoption of comparative neg-
ligence between plaintiffs and defendants and the
15. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 47 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS].
16. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 234-35, 588
P.2d 1308, 1312 (1978).
17. Id. at 235, 588 P.2d at 1312.
18. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 15, § 65.
19. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1090-91 (Fla. 1987).
20. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 157, 646 P.2d 579, 584
(N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Prosser, supra note 14, at 418).
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abandonment of the strict contributory negligence rule
sounded the death knell as well for the doctrine of joint and
several liability among defendants.
A few states abolished the doctrine of joint and several lia-
bility by judicial action finding the rule inconsistent with the
theory of comparative fault." The Washington Supreme Court
declined to do so, holding that the adoption of comparative
negligence did not require the abolition of the joint and several
liability doctrine.22 The court recognized, however, that the
legislature had the power to make such a change. 3
In 1986, the Washington State Legislature took that next
step in the evolution of tort law by adopting the Tort Reform
Act,24 which, inter alia, abolished the doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability in most cases in which the plaintiff is partially at
fault for his injuries. With the enactment of section 4.22.070 of
the Washington Revised Code,2" the legislature approached a
pure comparative fault system which equates recovery of dam-
ages and the duty to pay with the degree of fault. The legisla-
ture concluded that a fuller realization of this progressive
liability system required a change both in the common law rule
of contributory negligence-which had been accomplished by
statutory revision in 1973 26-and now in the doctrine of joint
and several liability.
Thus, Washington joined a host of other states that have
acted statutorily to abandon or significantly modify the joint
and several liability doctrine.2 ' To paraphrase the California
21. See, e.g., id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585; Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla.
1978); Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).
22. Seattle-First, 91 Wash. 2d at 234-38, 588 P.2d at 1311-14.
23. Id. at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313.
24. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, §§ 100-912, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354-67.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1989).
26. Act of April 24, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 949 (codified
as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005-.015 (1989)).
27. For example, and this list is not definitive, the states of California, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nevada,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming
have abrogated joint and several liability, in whole or in part. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.2
(West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111(3.5) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3)
(West 1990); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (1979 & Supp.
1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5(b) (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1983 & Supp. 1988); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2324
(West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6304 (1987); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-703 (1989);
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (Michie 1987); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1601 (McKinney
1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.485 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102(a), (b) (Purdon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN.
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Supreme Court's statement respecting that state's statutory
revision of the doctrine, Washington's "modification of the
common law joint and several liability rule was not an isolated
or aberrant phenomenon but rather paralleled similar develop-
ments in the evolution and implementation of the compara-
tive-fault principle in other states."2
A pure comparative fault system most nearly accomplishes
the goal of a fair system of apportioning damages by holding
both plaintiffs and defendants responsible for their actions to
the extent to which they cause injury. As the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held in abolishing the doctrine of joint and
several liability in that state, this, simply, is "justice."2 9
B. Washington's Statutory Modification of Joint and Several
Liability (Washington Revised Code Section 4.22.070)
Section 4.22.070 of the Washington Revised Code reads:
(1) In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the
trier of fact shall determine the percentage of the total fault
which is attributable to every entity which caused the claim-
ant's damages, including the claimant or person suffering
personal injury or incurring property damage, defendants,
third-party defendants, entities released by the claimant,
entities immune from liability to the claimant and entities
with any other individual defense against the claimant.
Judgment shall be entered against each defendant except
those who have been released by the claimant or are
immune from liability to the claimant or have prevailed on
any other individual defense against the claimant in an
amount which represents that party's proportionate share of
the claimant's total damages. The liability of each defendant
shall be several only and shall not be joint except:
(a) A party shall be responsible for the fault of another per-
son or for payment of the proportionate share of another
party where both were acting in concert or when a person
was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
(b) If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or party
suffering bodily injury or incurring property damages was
§ 78-27-38 to -40 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973 & Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE
§ 29-12A-7 (1986); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988).
28. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1200, 753 P.2d 585, 592, 246
Cal. Rptr. 629, 635 (1988).
29. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 155, 646 P.2d 579, 582
(N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 647,
275 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1979)).
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not at fault, the defendants against whom judgment is
entered shall be jointly and severally liable for the sum of
their proportionate shares of the claimants [sic] total
damages.
(2) If a defendant is jointly and severally liable under one of
the exceptions listed in subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this
section, such defendant's rights to contribution against
another jointly and severally liable defendant, and the effect
of settlement by either such defendant, shall be determined
under RCW 4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060.
(3)(a) Nothing in this section affects any cause of action
relating to hazardous wastes or substances or solid waste dis-
posal sites.
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect a cause of action aris-
ing from the tortious interference with contracts or business
relations.
c) Nothing in this section shall affect any cause of action
arising from the manufacture or marketing of a fungible
product in a generic form which contains no clearly identifi-
able shape, color, or marking.
3 0
Subsection 4.22.070(1) establishes the general rule of sev-
eral liability: that a person should not be liable for more than
his own proportionate share of the claimant's total damages.
The responsibility then falls to the trier of fact to "determine
the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every
entity which caused" the plaintiff's damages and each entity is
liable to pay only its own share of the loss.3 1
However, under paragraph (b) of subsection 4.22.070(1), a
limited form of joint and several liability is retained if the
claimant is not at fault. In that case, the defendants to the
action remain jointly and severally liable for "the sum of their
proportionate shares of the claimants [sic] total damages, "32
that is, for the sum of all damages attributable to all defend-
ants to the lawsuit. Thus, except for that part of the damages
attributable to the fault of an entity which was released by the
plaintiff, is immune from liability, has an individual defense
against the plaintiff, or otherwise was not made party to the
suit, each defendant remains responsible for the total amount
of damages proved by the plaintiff, less, of course, that portion
attributed to the plaintiff's own comparative fault.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1989).
31. Id. § 4.22.070(1).
32. Id. § 4.22.070(1)(b).
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In addition, under paragraph (a) of subsection 4.22.070(1),
a defendant remains responsible for the actions of another
party if the defendant acted "in concert" with that person to
cause the claimant's injury or the person causing the injury
was an agent or servant of the defendant.33
In two categories of actions, hazardous waste and business
torts, subsection 4.22.070(3) preserves pure joint and several
liability, making each defendant liable for the entire loss, less
any share attributable to the plaintiff's fault.34 A third excep-
tion,35 involving assessment of liability on a market share basis
for injuries caused by generic products, to which joint and sev-
eral liability thus had not previously applied, "was singled out
so as to indicate affirmatively that the legislature did not
intend to change the existing law in this area. 36
III. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution pro-
vides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. '37
In Sofie v. Fibreboard Corporation,3" the Washington Supreme
Court ruled that the provision in the Tort Reform Act of 1986
placing a cap or ceiling on the amount of noneconomic dam-
ages that could be awarded 39 unconstitutionally intruded upon
the jury's function of determining the amount of a plaintiff's
damages.4"
Prior to Sofie, there had been no suggestion that section
4.22.070 was vulnerable to challenge on this basis.4' Following
this decision, however, plaintiffs' attorneys have increasingly
viewed the jury right clause as an all-purpose weapon for
attacking other provisions in the Tort Reform Act. There
appears to be a belief among some in the plaintiffs' bar that
the Sofie decision leads inevitably to the conclusion that the
joint and several liability modification must also fall.
To the contrary, there is no logical connection between the
33. Id. § 4 .2 2 .07 0(1)(a).
34. Id. § 4 .22 .070(3)(a), (b).
35. Id. § 4 .2 2 .0 7 0(3)(c).
36. Comment, supra note 5, at 242.
37. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21.
38. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, amended, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1988).
40. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 643-66, 771 P.2d at 715-27.
41. See, e.g., Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 239-44 (although
presenting a laundry list of purported constitutional objections to § 4.22.070, the
authors did not include the right to jury trial provision among them).
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conclusion that the noneconomic damages cap infringed upon
the right to trial by jury and the argument that the joint and
several liability modification is similarly infirm. By contrast to
the damages cap, section 4.22.070 strengthens the role of the
jury in deciding tort actions by ensuring that the jury's deter-
minations on the apportionment of fault are enforced in the
entry of the judgment.
The distinctly different nature of the joint and several lia-
bility change from the damages cap is illustrated by the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Department of Insur-
ance.4 2 In that case, the Florida Supreme Court struck down a
cap on noneconomic damages in :tort cases as a violation of the
right of access to the courts under the Florida Constitution.43
But the court upheld a separate provision in Florida's tort
reform statute which provided that each defendant in a per-
sonal injury action would be liable only for his own percentage
share of the plaintiff's losses.44 The court found that this dis-
tinct provision did not violate any right of access to the courts
"because that right does not include the right to recover for
injuries beyond those caused by the particular defendant.
45
Likewise, the right to trial by jury does not include the right to
recover damages for which a particular defendant is not
responsible.
The actual holdings of the Sofie court confirm the inappli-
cability of the trial by jury guarantee to the joint and several
liability modification. The Sofie court stressed the fundamen-
tal constitutional magnitude of the "jury's fact-finding func-
tion," which includes "the determination of the amount of
damages."46 The cap on damages was held to violate this con-
stitutional guarantee because it had the effect of "directly pre-
determining the limits of a jury's fact-finding powers" on the
issue of damages.47
No such intrusion into the jury's fact-finding powers, how-
ever, is occasioned by a limitation on the joint and several lia-
bility doctrine. The opposite is true. The jury is granted the
power to apportion culpability among all parties and responsi-
ble entities. By apportioning fault, the jury also determines
42. 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
43. Id. at 1087-90.
44. Id. at 1090-91.
45. Id. at 1091.
46. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 651, 771 P.2d at 719.
47. Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 727.
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the cause of that share of the damages. Thus, the jury's key
role in determining responsibility and allocating fault is actu-
ally strengthened by section 4.22.070. In contrast with the cap
on damages, which the Sofie court held nullified the jury's
findings, section 4.22.070 removes the artificial joint and sev-
eral liability rule under most circumstances and instead gives
fuller effect to the jury's allocation of fault among the
defendants.
In sum, the key to the result in Sofie was that the imposi-
tion of a cap on damages "directly change[d] the outcome of a
jury determination. '4' By eliminating joint and several liabil-
ity in most cases, section 4.22.070 not only does not change the
outcome of the jury's determination on the degree of fault, it
confirms that decision and requires that the jury's findings be
reflected in the final award of damages against each individual
defendant.
IV. DUE PROCESS
A. Substantive Due Process and Fundamental Fairness
Although objections to section 4.22.070 may be garbed in
constitutional clothing, a common theme in many of these
arguments is that the partial abolition of joint and several lia-
bility is simply unfair.49 The detractors of this statutory revi-
sion apparently believe that, under principles of fundamental
fairness, a plaintiff must be allowed to place the full burden of
damages on any one of several tortfeasors available to be sued,
however large or small that entity's contribution to the harm.
In essence, this fundamental fairness argument reflects an
attempt to engraft a heightened "substantive" protection onto
the due process clause of the Washington Constitution,5 0 and to
thereby confer on the courts the authority to adjudge the wis-
dom of legislative enactments.
This effort to revive discarded notions of substantive due
process should be firmly rejected as inconsistent with prece-
dent in Washington. In Aetna Life Insurance Company v.
Washington Life and Disability Insurance Guaranty Associa-
tion,5' the Washington Supreme Court ruled:
48. Id. at 654, 771 P.2d at 720.
49. See Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 236-38 (characterizing
modifications in § 4.22.070 as "unfair" and therefore "unreasonable").
50. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3.
51. 83 Wash. 2d 523, 520 P.2d 162 (1974).
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Th[e] unfortunate history of the due process clause in the
United States Supreme Court presents to this court a sober-
ing lesson in the necessity for judicial deference to the legis-
lature in the exercise of its police power to accomplish
economic regulation.
Were we to accept appellant's invitation to void the act
here on substantive due process grounds, we would set a pre-
cedent for embarking upon a course already traveled and
finally rejected by the United States Supreme Court.5 2
The Washington Constitution's due process clause is pat-
terned after the federal constitutional counterpart and pro-
vides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."5 3 Because of the virtual
identity of language in both clauses, the Washington Supreme
Court has ruled that the state constitutional provision gener-
ally is to be read together with the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.' Therefore, holdings of the
United States Supreme Court regarding due process, while not
controlling, are entitled to great weight.5 5
The United States Supreme Court has continually refused
to adopt any heightened scrutiny of the substance of legislation
under the due process clause. In Duke Power Company v. Car-
olina Environmental Study Group,56 the Court expressly
declined to adopt a "more elevated standard of review" for a
due process challenge to a statutory limitation on tort liabil-
ity.5 1 Washington courts have likewise held that a statute may
be invalidated on "substantive" due process grounds only if it
is arbitrary or unreasonable.5"
In any event, accusations of substantive due process viola-
tions cast against section 4.22.070 turn the truth upside-down.
The true inequity was that the doctrine of joint and several lia-
bility lingered on after the advent of the theory of comparative
52. Id. at 534, 520 P.2d at 169.
53. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. The United States Constitution provides that "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. See, e.g., In re Young, 95 Wash. 2d 216, 622 P.2d 373 (1980).
55. See, e.g., In re Reismiller, 101 Wash. 2d 291, 678 P.2d 323 (1984); In re Young,
95 Wash. 2d 216, 622 P.2d 373 (1980); Olympic Forest Prods. v. Chaussee Corp., 82
Wash. 2d 418, 421-22, 511 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1973).
56. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
57. Id. at 83-84.
58. Danielson v. City of Seattle, 45 Wash. App. 235, 244, 724 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1986),
aff'd, 108 Wash. 2d 788, 742 P.2d 717 (1987); Grader v. City of Lynnwood, 53 Wash.
App. 431, 438-39, 767 P.2d 952, 956, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 243 (1989).
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fault moved modern tort law beyond the rigid concepts of the
common law.59
The detractors who challenge the basic equity of section
4.22.070 forget that true fairness requires consideration of the
defendant as well as the plaintiff. As the Kansas Supreme
Court held in rejecting the doctrine of joint and several
liability:
There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is
10% at fault paying 100% of the loss, and there is no social
policy that should compel defendants to pay more than their
fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs now take the parties as they
find them. If one of the parties at fault happens to be a
spouse or a governmental agency and if by reason of some
competing social policy the plaintiff cannot receive payment
for his injuries from the spouse or agency, there is no com-
pelling social policy which requires the codefendant to pay
more than his fair share of the loss. The same is true if one
of the defendants is wealthy and the other is not.60
Under the prior, incomplete system adopted in 1973,61
which provided for comparative fault only between plaintiffs
and defendants, plaintiffs were encouraged to target "deep
59. At common law, three strict and often harsh rules of liability prevailed:
1. A plaintiff who was contributorily negligent, however slightly, could not
recover any amount from any defendant;
2. A defendant who was responsible only in part for a plaintiff's injury could not
obtain contribution from other negligent defendants for monies paid to a plaintiff; and
3. A plaintiff had the right to collect all damages awarded in the judgment
against any one of several defendants, at the plaintiff's unrestricted election.
Over a period of years, slowly but deliberately, the Washington Legislature
abandoned the all-or-nothing common law approach. That outdated legal regime based
on concepts of the unity of harm and the refusal to measure degrees of fault has now
been largely superseded by a progressive comparative fault system. In 1973, the
Washington Legislature adopted a pure comparative negligence statute to replace the
contributory negligence rule with the concept of relative fault between plaintiffs and
defendants. Act of April 24, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 949
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005-.015 (1989)). This was the first
step. In 1981, the legislature enacted legislation permitting a defendant who bore the
brunt of a judgment to seek contribution from other defendants also found to be at
fault. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, §§ 12-14, 1981 Wash. Laws 118-19 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.22.040-.060 (1989)). This was the second step. Finally, through the Tort
Reform Act of 1986, the legislature put in place a complete and nearly pure system of
comparative fault by largely abandoning the doctrine of joint and several liability.
Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 401, 1986 Wash. Laws 1357 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.070 (1989)).
60. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 203, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978).
61. Act of April 24, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 949 (codified
as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005-015 (1989)).
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pocket" defendants, typically entities, such as governmental
agencies and large corporations, who although perhaps only
marginally at fault had a greater ability to pay. Consider the
example of an immune or judgment-proof defendant who was
70 percent at fault, another "deep pocket" defendant who was
10 percent at fault, and a plaintiff who was 20 percent at fault.
Under the governing law prior to the 1986 Tort Reform Act,
the plaintiff who was 20 percent responsible for his or her own
damages could recover 80 percent of the damages from the
defendant who was only 10 percent responsible. It is impossi-
ble to justify such a result; this outcome properly cannot obtain
under the new statute.6 2
Washington's new approach-a nearly pure comparative
fault system among all parties and entities-is characterized by
the touchstone principle of fairness that the law should not
place the full burden of liability upon one who is only partly
responsible for a loss. Under a tort system of liability based on
comparative fault, the "primal concept that . .. the extent of
fault should govern the extent of liability-remains irresistible
to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness. '"63 Section
4.22.070 fully comports with principles of fundamental fairness
under any theory of substantive due process.
B. Purported Due Process Right to Quid Pro Quo or
Adequate Alternative Remedy for Change in
Common Law Rule
It is much too late in the day to contend that any party has
a vested due process right in the continuation of a common law
rule--or any rule of law-for his own benefit.64  Simply
because the doctrine of joint and several liability persisted for
decades before the evolution to comparative fault does not
make it an inalienable right. As the Washington Supreme
Court held in Godfrey v. State:
65
62. But see WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1989) (defining three exceptions to the
modification of joint and several liability).
63. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 156, 646 P.2d 579, 583
(N.M. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M. 1982) (quoting Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rtpr. 858 (1975)); see also
Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Okla. 1978).
64. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) ("no person has a
vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged
for his benefit").
65. 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975).
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Due process does not prevent a change in the common law
as it previously existed. There is neither a vested right to an
existing law which precludes its amendment or repeal nor a
vested right in the omission to legislate on a particular sub-
ject. The Fourteenth Amendment does not curtail a state's
power to amend its laws, common or statutory, to conform to
changes in public policy. A vested right, entitled to protec-
tion from legislation, must be something more than a mere
expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the
existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable,
to the present or future enjoyment of property, a demand, or
a legal exemption from a demand by another.66
Indeed, in the context of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, the
Washington Supreme Court in Daggs v. City of Seattle67
explained that "a tort victim has no right to recover under the
old common law system, even if the new Tort Reform Act
would adversely affect the total amount he or she would
receive as damages.
'6
Although challengers to section 4.22.070 generally stop
short of asserting any vested right in the continuation of a
common law rule, they contend there is a due process require-
ment of some quid pro quo or adequate alternative remedy
that must be provided to plaintiffs in exchange for the loss of
the joint and several liability doctrine. 9 But this reasonable
substitute remedy demand is simply another way of contending
that plaintiffs had a vested right in the common law joint and
several liability rule. Only if the right is regarded as vested in
some manner can it be contended that a quid pro quo is a pre-
requisite to its alteration.7 °
66. Id. at 962-63, 530 P.2d at 632 (citations omitted; emphasis in original); see also
Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) ("the Constitution does not forbid the creation
of new [common law] rights, or the abolition of old ones . . .to attain a permissible
legislative object"); Grimesy v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no fifth
amendment violation in statute withdrawing cause of action and thereby barring
pending claim); In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d
982, 989 (9th Cir. 1987) (a cause of action "is inchoate and affords no definite or
enforceable property right until reduced to final judgment"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905
(1988); Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1985) (there is no vested
due process right in the continuation of the doctrine of unlimited joint and several
liability).
67. 110 Wash. 2d 49, 750 P.2d 626 (1988).
68. Id. at 57, 750 P.2d at 630.
69. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 211-20.
70. One commentator has expressed the view that the due process clause of the
federal constitution restricts the authority of the legislature to limit the rules
governing tort recoveries without providing just compensation for the loss suffered by
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Given the clear statement by the Washington Supreme
Court that the legislature is free to alter common law rules,
"both judicial precedent and common sense call for the courts
to reject [the quid pro quo theory]."7 1 As one commentator has
warned:
To require a legislature to create a "reasonable substitute"
every time that it abrogates or modifies outmoded common
law actions or defenses forces state policymakers into a legis-
lative straight jacket. Moreover, by immunizing common
law rights from total abrogation, the doctrine effectively
raises common law causes of action to the level of constitu-
tional rights, a status they were never intended to have. The
fundamental assumption of common law development has
always been that doctrines and rights could grow or recede,
depending on the social needs or mores of the time. To
freeze common law rights under the protection of the due
process clause destroys this potential for evolution and
undermines the creative potential of the common law.
7 2
Of those few states which have applied a quid pro quo
analysis to changes in common law rules, a number have
viewed that requirement as incorporated within state constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing a remedy for legal wrongs.7 3
the change. Rudolph, The Tort Crisis: Causes, Solutions, and the Constitution, 11 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 659, 674-81 (1988). This argument, however, seems to be simply
a variant of the quid pro quo theory since compensation would not be required unless
the governmental action involved the taking of a vested property right. Moreover,
Professor Rudolph formulates this requirement in terms of an affirmative obligation
on behalf of the government to protect citizens from intentional or negligent infliction
of injury by providing for a statutory remedy. Id. Very recently, however, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the idea that the due process clause not only limits the
use of governmental powers but affirmatively requires that they be exercised to
protect citizens, absent the formulation of a special ward relationship between the
government and the citizen seeking protection. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Social Servs., 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989). In any event, Professor Rudolph views the joint
and several liability modification in the Tort Reform Act as justifiable under his
analysis because it increases fairness in the liability system. Rudolph, supra, at 675.
71. Comment, Developments in the Law, The 1986 Washington Tort Reform Act:
Noneconomic Damages Cap (RCW 4.56.250), 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 211, 215, 227
(1987).
72. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REV. 759, 787 (1977); see also Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 113, 256 N.W.2d 657, 671 (1977) ("[tlhere is no merit to the
argument that if a common law right is to be taken away something must be given in
return").
73. See, e.g., Firemen's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 335-56 (Ala.
1980); Caviness v. City of Vale, 86 Or. 554, 562-63 169 P. 95, 98 (1917); Sax v. Votteler,
648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983). See generally Redish, supra note 72, at 788.
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Although an early draft of the Washington Constitution of
1889 contained a clause guaranteeing that "every person shall
have remedy by due course of law for injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation,"74 that remedy language was
dropped altogether by the Washington constitutional conven-
tion.75 In Shea v. Olson,76 the Washington Supreme Court
declared that Washington's Constitution lacked any remedy
provision:
In this state, the constitution contains no such [remedy] pro-
vision, but only the general "due process" and "equal protec-
tion" clauses. There is, therefore, no express, positive
mandate of the constitution which preserves [tort] rights of
action from abolition by the legislature . ..."
In view of the court's rulings in Shea and Godfrey v.
State,78 affirming unequivocally the authority of the Legisla-
ture to modify and abolish rules of the common law, the quid
pro quo theory has no currency in Washington. 79 Any attempt
74. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at
51 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
75. Instead of adopting a remedy provision similar to the Oregon Constitution as
was proposed at the Washington constitutional convention, id. at 499 & n.18, the
Washington Constitution, article I, § 10, states only: "Justice in all cases shall be
administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." It is a quantum leap from that
"open access" provision to a guarantee of a right to a particular tort remedy or
substantive rule of law.
76. 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
77. Id. at 160-61, 53 P.2d at 622.
One student law review Comment has urged implication of a remedy provision
into article I, § 10 of the Washington Constitution to limit legislative modification of
tort law rules. Comment, State Constitutional Remedy Provisions and Article 1,
Section 10 of the Washington State Constitution: The Possibility of Greater Judicial
Protection of Established Tort Causes of Action and Remedies, 64 WASH. L. REV. 203
(1989). The student author acknowledged that remedy language had been deleted by
the constitutional framers, id. at 215-18, and that the Shea v. Olson decision expressly
disclaimed the presence of a remedy guarantee in the Washington Constitution, id. at
218-19. Nevertheless, the author, invoking "the state court's freedom to confer
additional rights and safeguards," suggested that neither the adverse historical record
nor precedent should dissuade Washington courts from adopting a constitutional
provision which the framers omitted. Id. at 219, 225-26. This unusually bald appeal to
judicial activism in its rawest form is unlikely to be accepted.
78. Godfrey, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 962-63, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975); see also supra text
accompanying note 66 (quoting Godfrey).
79. The only true case law support for the quid pro quo theory is a concurring
opinion in a 1936 Washington decision. See Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188
Wash. 396, 426-27, 63 P.2d 397, 410 (1936) (Tolman, J., concurring). The most recent
decisions, Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P. 2d 630 (1975) and Daggs v. City of
Seattle, 110 Wash. 2d 49, 750 P. 2d 626 (1988), emphatically reject attempts to vest
common law rules into constitutional mandates.
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to devise a new right to an adequate alternative remedy before
supposedly vested common law rules may be modified must be
squarely rejected. The quid pro quo concept is actually just
part and parcel of a substantive due process theory, another
theory which has been discredited in Washington.80
In any event, even if a quid pro quo were required, section
4.22.070, together with other related statutes, amply supplies
that substitute remedy. This is clearly seen when the abolition
or limitation of joint and several liability is considered in the
fuller context of the evolution of a comparative fault system in
Washington.
Prior to the adoption of the 1973 comparative negligence
statute,8 1 a culpable defendant could avoid judgment by show-
ing even the slightest culpability on the part of the plaintiff.
Thus, in the ordinary case where a plaintiff bears at least some
responsibility for his own injury, the abolition of joint and sev-
eral liability takes nothing away from the plaintiff that was
available at common law. At common law, that contributorily
negligent plaintiff was barred absolutely from any recovery.
The equitable quid pro quo for abrogating the harsh rule of
contributory negligence and allowing a partially culpable plain-
tiff to recover is now to also limit the plaintiff's recovery
against a given defendant to the share of damages caused by
that defendant.
In the case of the truly innocent plaintiff, who is not even
slightly at fault for his own injury, the 1986 Tort Reform Act
preserves joint and several liability among those defendants to
the action against whom judgment is entered. 2 It is true that
this is a limited form of joint and several liability and does not
require those defendants to pay the proportionate share of
damages attributable to the actions of immune entities, entities
released by the plaintiff, or entities that have an individual
defense to liability. These limitations, however, are amply
justified.
In the case of entities released by the plaintiff and entities
that have an individual defense to liability, the inability to
obtain recovery is properly laid at the plaintiff's door. Once a
plaintiff releases an entity from liability, there is no logical
80. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
81. Act of April 24, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 949 (codified
as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005-.015 (1989)).
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1989).
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reason to permit the plaintiff to hold an unreleased defendant
liable for the released entity's share of the loss. It is appropri-
ate that a plaintiff "profit[] from a wise settlement and suffer[]
from a poor one."83 Similarly, if an entity escapes liability to
the plaintiff because of an individual defense, there is no basis
for shifting the burden of that share of liability to another
defendant. Ordinarily, the availability of an individual defense
is attributable to an error or omission by the plaintiff. To use a
common individual defense as an example, if the plaintiff is
unable to sue a potential defendant because the statute of limi-
tations has run, it is entirely equitable to require the plaintiff
to bear any losses that result from the failure to file a timely
action. Indeed, it would be unjust to require other defendants
to bear the burden of the plaintiff's negligence in failing to
preserve the right to recover against that individual defendant.
With respect to entities that are immune from liability, a
social judgment has been made that a particular type of entity
should not be subject to suit.8 4 There is no compelling basis for
requiring a defendant to bear the cost of this social policy judg-
ment and pay that portion of damages attributable to the fault
of the immune entity. If the plaintiff has been aggrieved in
such circumstances, the complaint goes to the policy decision to
afford immunity to that entity.85 The plaintiff cannot legiti-
mately demand that the difference in award be made up by
imposing additional liability upon a party defendant who was
not immune from suit.
Because governmental entities have largely shed the cloak
of sovereign immunity, the instances in which a culpable entity
may assert immunity from suit are decreasing. Probably the
most common circumstance in which immunity may still be
claimed is also the one in which the presence of an adequate
alternative remedy is most manifest.86  Under the workers'
83. Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort Reform Act: Partial Tort Settlements After the
Demise of Joint and Several Liability, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 67, 90 (1986/87) (viewing this
result as a disadvantageous one).
84. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 203, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978).
85. In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1465, 1466-67
(D. Colo. 1989).
86. One other recurring situation involves injuries to children who were not
properly supervised or warned by their parents. Parents are immune from liability to
their children in this situation. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 105 Wash. 2d 118, 712
P.2d 293 (1986); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. 1, 105 Wash. 2d 99, 103-
06, 713 P.2d 79, 82-84 (1986). However, in a lawsuit brought against a third party for
the child's injury, it is likely that a parent could waive immunity and be joined as a
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compensation statute, an employer is immune from suit in an
action involving injuries to an employee,8" although a tort
action may still be brought against a third party, such as the
manufacturer of machinery or equipment used by the
employee at the time of the injury. Under section 4.22.070, an
injured employee may no longer recover from the third party
that share of the damages which were attributable to the
actions of the immune employer. Nevertheless, there are two
reasons why the injured employee cannot complain about a
deprivation of just compensation.
First, there was certainly nothing just about the former
regime under which liability for the total loss could be imposed
on a third party although the plaintiff had already been com-
pensated by workers' compensation for the employer's share of
the liability.8" The old rule, which placed full liability on a
third-party tortfeasor when an employer was at least partially
responsible, was indefensible. Since the industrial insurance
program functions as a statutory substitute for a tort action
accusing the employer of wrongful conduct, the employee's
claim for the employer's share of the damages should be
regarded as having been satisfied by the payment of workers'
compensation benefits.
Second, and in keeping with the principle that industrial
insurance is a substitute for a tort action against the employer,
the workers' compensation statute was amended in the Tort
Reform Act of 1986 to assure that "employees injured in whole
or in part by the negligence of their employer or co-employee
[have] the ability to collect both the full amount of their work-
ers' compensation benefits and the full amount of a judgment
against the third party."8 9 Subsection (f) was added to Wash-
defendant in order to allow the child to take advantage of the limited joint and several
liability provision. If the parent were so joined, and assuming that the child was
without contributory blame, the other defendants would remain jointly and severally
liable for that portion of the damages attributable to the parent's neglect. Peck, supra
note 14, at 245. But even if a parent cannot be so joined, it is not apparent why
another party should be held responsible for the parent's proportionate responsibility
simply because of the fortuitous circumstance that one of the culpable parties was the
parent of the injured plaintiff.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1989).
88. However, under the prior system, the employee who recovered from a third
party was required to reimburse the state Department of Labor and Industries or the
self-insured employer for at least part of the workers' compensation benefits already
paid. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.060 (1985).
89. Comment, Development in the Law, The 1986 Washington Tort Reform Act:
[Vol. 13:433
Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986
ington Revised Code section 51.24.06090 to provide that workers
who can show their injuries were caused in part by an
employer or coemployee will be able to keep the entire judg-
ment against third-party tortfeasors and will not have to reim-
burse the Department of Labor and Industries for any
workers' compensation benefits.
In this way, the Tort Reform Act "gives back to the
injured worker some of what . . . the elimination of joint and
several liability[] takes away."'" This additional benefit quite
adequately compensates employees for the loss of joint and
several liability while also avoiding the inequity of holding a
third party liable for all damages when an employer or coem-
ployee was also partially at fault. Indeed, at least one commen-
tator believes the Tort Reform Act is unduly generous in this
respect and that "[a] favored class of personal injury claimants
has been created at the expense of the industrial insurance
funds and industry.
92
Even if the new comparative fault system does not always
provide as much in the way of recovery to a plaintiff as the
prior common law system, that is no basis for a constitutional
challenge. The Washington Supreme Court has upheld against
constitutional attack statutory compensation systems which did
not precisely duplicate the benefits available at common law.
For example, in Haddenham v. State,93 the court approved a
statute that simultaneously abolished all claims against the
state arising out of criminal conduct and instituted a system of
fixed compensation for crime victims. The court noted that
tort claims against the state were abrogated in consideration
for the provision of assured compensation to all crime victims
"irrespective of questions of negligence and fault."94 Likewise,
in Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission,9  the court
upheld the workers' compensation scheme as part of the statu-
tory compromise assuring a certain recovery although the
injured employee had "to accept far less than he had often won
Apportionment of Damages in Workers' Compensation (RCW 51.24.060), 23
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 211, 249, 250 (1987).
90. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 403, 1986 Wash. Laws 1358-61 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.060(f) (1989)).
91. Comment, supra note 89, at 249-50.
92. Bush, The Impact of the Tort Reform Act Upon the Industrial Insurance Act,
22 GOHZ. L. REV. 121, 130 (1986/87).
93. 87 Wash. 2d 145, 550 P.2d 9 (1976).
94. Id. at 151, 550 P.2d at 13.
95. 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256 (1916).
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in court."96
In addition to the direct alternative remedies to joint and
several liability afforded to contibutorily negligent plaintiffs
through the adoption of a comparative fault system and to
injured workers by protected benefits under the workers' com-
pensation program, a substantial quid pro quo may also be
found in the overall benefits achieved through tort reform.
The enhancement of equity and justice through a pure compar-
ative fault system and the availability and reduction in costs of
insurance anticipated by the legislature are substantial benefits
to the entire community.9 This societal quid pro quo inures to
the benefit of plaintiffs as well because the increased availabil-
ity and affordability of insurance means that more defendants
in civil actions will have adequate insurance to pay judgments.
C. Procedural Due Process
Concerns have also been raised about procedural problems
in the implementation of section 4.22.070.98 In particular, it has
been suggested that proper notice and an opportunity to be
heard may be lacking when fault is attributed to an entity that
is not actually joined as a defendant in the lawsuit.9 9
Although a cause of action may be a "species of property
protected by the . . .Due Process Clause,"' 0' that proposition
"does not answer the question of what process is due."'' The
modification of the joint and several liability rule is a substan-
tive change in the cause of action that is not subject to review
under due process.0 2 Instead, because the value of an inchoate
cause of action "is contingent on successful prosecution to judg-
96. Id. at 590-91, 158 P. at 258.
97. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 160 n. 18, 695 P.2d 665,
681-82 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385 n.18 (a viable medical malpractice insurance
industry would constitute an adequate quid pro quo benefit), appeal dismissed, 474
U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 599 (1980)
(societal quid pro quo for cap on tort damages found in the availability and reduction
in costs of insurance, the reduction in medical costs, and the preservation of health
care services for the benefit of the entire community, including plaintiffs). See
generally Comment, supra note 71, at 224-25 & nn.45-46.
98. Peck, supra note 5, at 690-93.
99. Id. at 694-703.
100. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
101. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982,
989-90 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
102. Logan, 455 U.S. at 432-33; In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport,
720 F. Supp. 1465, 1467 (D. Colo. 1989) (upholding Colorado's abolition of joint and
several liability against due process challenge).
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ment,"' 3 the only due process inquiry "focuses on assuring
access to fair procedures for its prosecution. 104
Thus, the question presented is whether the procedures
for apportioning fault among all responsible entities, including
entities not actually joined as defendants, allow a plaintiff an
"opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly
judged."'0 5 As long as all entities responsible for a plaintiff's
injury (including unjoined entities) are described in some way
and as long as the plaintiff has an opportunity to be heard and
present evidence on the culpability of these entities, the mini-
mal procedural guarantees of due process will be satisfied.
In the usual case, the identity of unjoined entities that
may also be responsible for the injury will be readily apparent.
In any event, the plaintiff will be apprised of the existence of
such entities through discovery and the listing of witnesses for
the trial. Whether or not the plaintiff can name an entity as a
party, the plaintiff will have had ample opportunity to explore
that entity's potential responsibility and to meet any evidence
concerning the culpability of nonparty entities. Even though
one of the chairs at trial may be "empty" in the sense that an
entity has not been or cannot be joined as a party, that entity
may still be called to court as a witness if identified.
Moreover, whether or not an unjoined entity has any
incentive to contest the allocation of fault to it, both plaintiffs
and defendants will have strong incentives to present evidence
and confront witnesses on the question of the entity's culpabil-
ity.10 6 The nonparty status of the entity should raise no diffi-
culties, at least not of constitutional dimension, in the
presentation of the case by the adverse plaintiffs and defend-
ants. The courts can establish rules requiring adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard on the attribution of fault to
entities not joined in the lawsuit. Indeed, these are precisely
103. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 989;
see also Haddenham v. State, 87 Wash. 2d 145, 149, 550 P.2d 9, 13 (1976) ("a tort cause
of action is not vested until it has been reduced to judgment").
104. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 989.
105. Logan, 455 U.S. at 433; see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981)
(procedural due process guarantees the right to reasonable notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard).
106. See Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 1989) (although
there will be "finger-pointing" at the "empty chair" of settling defendants whose fault
must still be apportioned as against remaining defendants in securities litigation, the
"financial motives of both plaintiffs and non-settling defendants to vigorously press
their arguments at trial will be unchanged").
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the kinds of mechanical matters pertaining to the procedures
of the courts over which the Washington Supreme Court has
asserted exclusive authority. °7
Even before the Tort Reform Act of 1986, when an injured
employee brought a personal injury action against a third
party, the Washington Supreme Court held the third party was
entitled to contend that the employer had been solely at fault,
notwithstanding the fact that the employer was immune from
liability under the workers' compensation program and thus
had not been joined as a defendant. 1°' This pronouncement
would appear to answer any argument that attributing fault to
an unjoined entity is somehow improper. If evidence of
another person's conduct is relevant to a case, whether that
person is a party has no bearing on whether that evidence
should be admitted and considered by the trier of fact.0 9
One commentator has suggested that the due process
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard would
be violated by assignment of fault to an unknown entity, such
as a "phantom" driver of an automobile who leaves the scene
of an accident without being identified."0 Assuming fault may
indeed be attributed to an unidentified tortfeasor under the
statute,"' it is not clear why this raises any insurmountable
due process obstacles. 112 The fact that an entity cannot be
107. State v. Smith, 84 Wash. 2d 498, 501-02, 527 P.2d 674, 676-77 (1974).
108. Lamborn v. Phillips Pac. Chem. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 701, 706-07, 575 P.2d 215, 219
(1978); Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 88, 549 P.2d 483, 486
(1976).
109. See Lamborn, 89 Wash. 2d at 706, 575 P.2d at 219.
110. Peck, supra note 5, at 697.
111. Subsection 4.22.070(1) specifies several types of entities whose percentage of
fault must be determined by the trier of fact-"including the claimant or person
suffering personal injury or incurring property damage, defendants, third-party
defendants, entities released by the claimant, entities immune from liability to the
claimant and entities with any other individual defense against the claimant." See
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1989). Since unknown entities are not so denominated,
an argument could perhaps be made that the statute does not contemplate
apportionment of fault to an unknown tortfeasor. However, the subject provision
begins by stating that the "trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault which is
attributable to every entity which caused the claimants [sic] damages." Id. (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the listed entities appear to be simply representative examples
"includ[ed]" within the broader category of "every entity." Id.
112. In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M. 1982) the New Mexico
Court of Appeals abolished the doctrine of joint and several liability in the context of
an automobile accident in which 70 percent of the fault was assigned by the jury to an
unknown driver who left the scene of the accident. Id. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580.
Without expressly addressing possible due process concerns, the court held it was
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identified does not necessarily mean there is any lack of evi-
dence concerning the entity's existence or the extent to which
that entity contributed to the tort. Witnesses to the incident-
presumably including the plaintiff-may be able to testify to
another entity's conduct and involvement in the incident. The
fact that the entity is not available to appear in court does not
bar the presentation and consideration of evidence on the
entity's comparative fault.
Certainly a defendant is entitled to avoid liability alto-
gether by proving that an unknown entity was the sole cause
of the plaintiff's harm. There is, therefore, no logical reason
why a defendant might not also attempt to reduce exposure to
full liability by attributing a portion of the fault to an unidenti-
fied entity whose existence and culpable conduct can be proven
through competent corroborating evidence. Similarly, a
defendant indisputably could argue that an accident occurred,
not because of the defendant's negligence, but rather by virtue
of unusual weather conditions. In blaming an "Act of God," a
defendant would not then be required to call the Almighty to
the stand to be examined. Thus, the behavior of a "phantom"
or unknown tortfeasor can be verified by evidence in much the
same way as the parties establish the objective circumstances
surrounding or the context underlying an alleged tort.
Admittedly, section 4.22.070 neglects to spell out precise
procedures to be applied after the adoption of the pure com-
parative fault system. But the fact that a statute's "language
leaves a number of issues of interpretation and application to
be decided in future cases . . . provide[s] no justification for
striking down the measure on its face."' 13 Even critics of sec-
tion 4.22.070 have generally acknowledged that the judiciary is
empowered to develop solutions to most procedural problems
that arise so as to sustain and implement a new statutory
scheme.1 1
4
proper to instruct the jury to apportion negligence to all tortfeasors, including the
unknown driver. Id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
113. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1193, 753 P.2d 585, 587, 246
Cal. Rptr. 629, 631, reh'g denied, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585 (1988)
(considering constitutional challenge to statute limiting joint and several liability).
114. Peck, supra note 5, at 693.
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V. EQUAL PROTECTION/PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
A. Introduction
Article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution pro-
vides: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of
citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or
immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally
belong to all citizens, or corporations."
115
In American Network, v. Washington Utilities & Trans-
portation Commission,"6 the Washington Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its longstanding position: "The privileges and
immunities clause of the Washington State Constitution (arti-
cle I, section 12) and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment are substantially identical and have been
considered by this Court as one issue.""' 7 The central com-
mand of the equal protection and privileges and immunities
clauses, of course, is that the government may not treat classes
of people differently unless there is a reasonable basis for the
differentiation."'
Detractors of the statutory modification of joint and sev-
eral liability contend that classifications purportedly created by
section 4.22.070 violate the constitutional guarantees of equal
protection under the federal constitution and of privileges and
immunities under the state constitution." 9 They argue that,
applying a form of elevated scrutiny, the statute impairs a con-
stitutionally recognized right of injured plaintiffs to full com-
pensation for all damages sustained. Moreover, they entreat
the Washington courts to adopt a construction of Washington's
115. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
116. 113 Wash. 2d 59, 776 P.2d 950 (1989).
117. Id. at 77, 776 P.2d at 960; see also In re Borders, 114 Wash. 2d 171, 175, 789
P.2d 786 (1990) (the privileges and immunities clause provides protection substantially
identical to that of the equal protection clause); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662,
676, 732 P.2d 989, 998 (1987) (the privileges and immunities clause provides protection
substantially identical to that of the equal protection clause), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1008 (1988).
118. Haddenham v. State, 87 Wash. 2d 145, 150, 550 P.2d 9, 13 (1976) ("[tlhe
guaranty is not of absolute equality, requiring the law to treat all persons exactly
alike" but rather whether there is a reasonable basis for the lines drawn).
119. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 198-200, 204-11, 239-41. The
equal protection/privileges and immunities arguments by opponents of the statute
track and duplicate much of the argument pertaining to substantive due process
objections to the fundamental fairness of the modification of joint and several liability.
Accordingly, the earlier discussion concerning the basic equity underlying this
statutory implementation of the comparative fault basis for modern tort liability has
relevance for this inquiry as well. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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privileges and immunities clause that extends beyond equal
protection, giving heightened protection to tort plaintiffs and
circumscribing legislative authority to effect changes in com-
mon law liability doctrines.
By so contending, these commentators urge the Washing-
ton courts to embrace a novel and unduly intrusive model for
judicial review of legislative enactments, one untethered to
objective constitutional standards. Unless the Washington
courts are to embark upon an unprecedented era of activism,
overturning long-standing principles of constitutional interpre-
tation and engaging in exacting scrutiny of statutes touching
upon a broad array of public concerns, this invitation should be
declined. In any event, section 4.22.070 does not deny any
plaintiff access to relief. By any standard, its provisions are
rationally, indeed substantially, related to the important pur-
pose of furthering greater equity in the rules for imposition of
tort liability.
B. Standard of Review
Under traditional equal protection analysis, most statutes
are reviewed under a deferential rational basis test. Where no
"suspect classification," such as race, or "fundamental right" is
involved, 2 ' the test is whether any difference in treatment
established by statutory classifications "is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that
[the court] can only conclude that the legislature's actions were
irrational.' ' 2  The rational basis test is satisfied "if the legisla-
ture could have reasonably concluded that the challenged clas-
sification would promote a legitimate state purpose. "122
Opponents of Washington's Tort Reform Act, however,
contend that the revision or abrogation of common law tort
rules, such as the modification of joint and several liability
found in section 4.22.070, must be analyzed under an elevated
level of judicial scrutiny. They do not contend that a modifica-
tion of common law doctrines may be subjected to strict scru-
tiny, which applies to classifications that affect a suspect class
120. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-40
(1985); Forbes v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 929, 940 & n.11, 785 P.2d 431, 437 n.11 (1990).
121. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
122. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1982); see also Paulson v. County
of Pierce, 99 Wash. 2d 645, 652, 664 P.2d 1202, 1207 (statute "will not be invalidated
unless it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate state
objective"), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 957 (1983).
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or impinge upon a fundamental constitutional right. Rather,
they urge the courts to apply an "intermediate" or "height-
ened" level of review, arguing that injured plaintiffs constitute
some sort of "semi-suspect" class and that the right to recovery
in tort is an important, if not fundamental, right warranting a
level of protection higher than that of rational basis.123
The premises of this argument, however, are flawed.
First, the United States Supreme Court has reserved interme-
diate scrutiny for certain unique classifications, such as gender
or illegitimacy, which demonstrate at least some of the tradi-
tional indicia of a suspect class. 124 And the Washington courts
have not departed from the two-tiered scrutiny model even in
these contexts. Instead, gender, for example, has been treated
as a "suspect" class under Washington law.'25
It has yet to be persuasively demonstrated that tort plain-
tiffs "define a 'discrete and insular' group in need of 'extra-
ordinary protection from the majoritian political process.' "126
123. Peck, supra note 5, at 683 (asserting that "[tihe right to a remedy for physical
harm inflicted on a person by what is recognized as wrongful conduct should be at the
forefront of those rights entitled to [constitutional] protection"); Wiggins, Harnetiaux
& Whaley, supra note 5, at 198-200, 204-11, 339-41 (arguing indemnification for
personal injuries is a substantial property right warranting application of intermediate
scrutiny analysis to statutes affecting the right); Comment, Constitutional Challenges
to Washington's Limit on Noneconomic Damages in Cases of Personal Injury and
Death, 63 WASH. L. REV. 653, 666 (1988) (contending that "the right to be compensated
for personal injuries is important enough that statutes burdening the right trigger
intermediate scrutiny").
124. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1975)
(illegitimacy).
125. American Network, Inc. v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 113 Wash.
2d 59, 77-78 n.5, 776 P.2d 950, 960 n.5 (1989).
126. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1975) (quoting
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)). The objective
evidence indicates that the interests of tort plaintiffs are well represented in the
democratic political process. The American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA),
representing plaintiffs' attorneys, created a political action committee (PAC) to
contribute money to legislative candidates opposed to tort reform measures. Maxwell,
Law-Firm Influence: Law-Related PACs Get $2.75 Million Start on 1990 Election, 76
A.B.A. J. 18 (Jan. 1990). The ATLA PAC "raised more than $3.5 million in the 1987-88
[campaign] cycle, ranking it 13th among the nation's roughly 4,200 PACs." Id. The
Washington State Trial Lawyers Association (WSTLA) has flexed similar political
muscle. In 1988, WSTLA contributed $148,551 to political candidates according to the
state Public Disclosure Commission; only a business PAC and the state medical
association contributed more to Washington State candidates. Puget Sound Bus. J.,
Jan. 15, 1990, at 11, col. 2. Moreover, WSTLA employs two full time lobbyists to
present the organization's views on tort reform to Washington legislators. Id. at 11,
col. 3. In light of this activity, the argument that the interests of those opposed to tort
reform are not fairly represented in the political process rings rather hollow.
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Since everyone is equally subject to the "slings and arrows of
outrageous fortune," the suffering of an injury cannot be
viewed as an immutable characteristic akin to race or gender.
Being an injured plaintiff is more a circumstance than a status
implicating the core principles of equal protection. Indeed, it
may be questioned whether tort plaintiffs possess sufficiently
similar or unique characteristics so as to constitute a "class" at
all.'2 7
Second, the argument that a right to compensation for a
personal injury is a substantial right that requires heightened
protection misstates the question here. The definition of pre-
cisely what "right" is at issue is crucial. Section 4.22.070 does
not abolish any tort cause of action or limit access to the courts
to prosecute a tort claim.
The very recent decision of the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Kavadas v. Lorenzen 121 is instructive. The North
Dakota court does apply intermediate scrutiny to statutes that
"completely prevent[ a class of injured persons from maintain-
ing an action to recover for their injuries. "129 However, the
court did not extend elevated scrutiny to a statute similar to
section 4.22.070. Rather, it concluded that "[t]he elimination of
joint and several liability affects the amount of damages that
an injured party may recover [but] that party is not denied
access to the courts."' ° Likewise, the Iowa Supreme Court, in
Beeler v. Van Cannon,13" declined to apply heightened scrutiny
to a partial abolition of joint and several liability, saying,
"[i]nvolved is only the continued effectiveness of a common
law principle which, though it impacts greatly on the amount
of [plaintiff's] recovery, does not determine whether he is in or
127. See Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 525, 783 P.2d 506, 515-16 (1989) (in
rejecting a challenge to a statutory damages cap based on Oregon's "privileges and
immunities" clause, court rejected view that tort plaintiffs with a claim against a
governmental entity, possessing some immunity from suit, constituted a class treated
adversely to tort plaintiffs in general; holding, with respect to the latter, that "[t]hose
members of the total population who happen to be injured as a result of negligently
created dangerous conditions on a road or other kinds of negligence for which they can
hold someone fully liable are not an identifiable 'class' who . . . are given special
privileges by virtue of antecedent personal or social characteristics or societal status,
i.e., they could not already be singled out from the general population before their
various accidents").
128. 448 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1989).
129. Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 223.
131. 376 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1985).
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out of court.
132
Section 4.22.070 does not place any cap on damages to be
awarded or, in and of itself, limit the ability of injured plain-
tiffs to recover for all damages sustained. Although a plaintiff
may not be able to recover all damages attributable to the
actions of judgment-proof or immune entities, that is an obsta-
cle imposed separately by the financial circumstances of other
culpable parties or by other statutes that confer immunity
upon certain entities. Section 4.22.070 does not directly pre-
vent a plaintiff from seeking and obtaining full recovery by
collecting individually from each responsible entity.
Thus, advocates of heightened scrutiny of modified joint
and several liability do not really assert the right to maintain a
tort action or to recover full compensation for injuries. Rather,
they insist that a plaintiff has the right to recover the entire
award from any individual defendant he decides to target for
collection of the judgment, regardless of the share of fault
attributable to that individual defendant. To examine the
"right" actually asserted, this author submits, is to answer the
question whether it is worthy of heightened protection. And
both state and federal courts have consistently refused to apply
intermediate scrutiny to statutes abolishing or modifying joint
and several liability.
13 3
Even looked at in its broader incarnation as an alleged
right to recover damages for personal injuries, the precedents
of both the federal courts and the Washington Supreme Court
plainly establish that the rational basis level of scrutiny must
apply to restrictions upon tort liability and revisions of com-
mon law doctrines.
In Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group,34 the United State Supreme Court rejected
heightened scrutiny as applied to a statutory limitation on the
total amount of damages recoverable after a nuclear acci-
dent. 35 The Court characterized this restriction on tort recov-
ery as "a classic example of an economic regulation-a
132. Id. at 630, 376 N.W.2d at 630.
133. Eg., In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1465,
1466 (D. Colo. 1989); Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1202 n.9, 753 P.2d
585, 593 n.9, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 n.9, (1988); Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d
1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987); Beeler v. Van Cannon, 376 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Iowa 1985); Kavadas
v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Iowa 1989).
134. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
135. Id. at 83-88.
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legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the burdens
and benefits of economic life.' "136 The federal courts of
appeals have also rejected heightened scrutiny of limitations
on tort damages." 7
Several commentators contend138 that the Washington
Supreme Court adopted a heightened scrutiny approach
toward limitations on tort recovery in Hunter v. North Mason
High School.139 In that decision, the court invalidated on equal
protection grounds a claims filing statute that effectively short-
ened the statute of limitations for commencing actions against
governmental as opposed to private parties. In the course of its
decision, the court stated that "[tihe right to be indemnified for
personal injuries is a substantial property right, not only of
monetary value but in many cases fundamental to the injured
person's physical well-being and ability to continue to live a
decent life.'
' 40
However, the Washington Supreme Court has already dis-
missed the misinterpretation of Hunter as mandating elevated
scrutiny of statutes implicating tort recovery. In Daggs v. City
of Seattle,'4' the court rejected the argument that a city ordi-
nance requiring a tort victim to wait sixty days after filing a
claim with the city before filing suit violated equal protection
rights, notwithstanding that the delay meant the plaintiffs
must proceed under the newly effective Tort Reform Act with
its restrictions on damage recovery rather than under the prior
common law.142 The court acknowledged the language quoted
above from Hunter v. North Mason High School, but noted that
"[s]ignificantly, however, the opinion did not specify which
standard of review it applied.' 1 43 The Daggs court observed
that "[t]he more recent decisions surrounding claims filing
ordinances and statutes appear to follow a minimal scrutiny
136. Id. at 83 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
137. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (4th Cir. 1989); Lucas v. United States,
807 F.2d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 1986); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435-37 (9th
Cir. 1985).
138. Peck, supra note 5, at 683-84 (quoting Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85
Wash. 2d 810, 814, 539 P.2d 845, 848 (1975), without citation to the decision); Wiggins,
Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 199, 210; Comment, supra note 123.
139. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
140. Id. at 814, 539 P.2d at 848.
141. 110 Wash. 2d 49, 750 P.2d 626 (1988).
142. Id. at 55-57, 750 P.2d at 629-30.
143. Id. at 56, 750 P.2d at 630.
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standard of review.' '1 44
This line of analysis also appears to have been confirmed
in the recent Sofie v. Fibreboard Corporation decision.145 In
reviewing the Tort Reform Act's cap on noneconomic damages
in tort, the Washington Supreme Court held that "[i]n matters
of economic legislation, we follow the rule giving every reason-
able presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the law or
ordinance. ' 146 By thereby classifying the statutory limitation
on tort damages as a "matter of economic legislation," the
Sofie court implicitly suggested that the rational basis test
would apply to any equal protection challenge.
147
Moreover, on several occasions, the Washington Supreme
Court has taken pains to limit elevated scrutiny to a narrow
range of cases. 4 8 In State v. Smith, 49 the court rejected "dicta
appearing from time to time in our cases" that implied that
heightened scrutiny could be applied to laws not infringing
upon fundamental rights or creating a suspect classification.5 0
Indeed, the Smith court, to emphasize its point, expressly over-
ruled those prior decisions to the extent they enunciated a con-
trary view.' 51 The court refused to apply heightened scrutiny
to a penal statute involving possible incarceration and thereby
"substitute its judgment for that of the legislature."' 52
The Washington Supreme Court again adopted a cautious
approach to heightened scrutiny in In re Mayner.153 In that
decision, the court reversed an appellate court opinion embrac-
ing a broader view of heightened scrutiny in the context of a
statutory classification affecting a prisoner's credit for time
incarcerated after sentencing.'- The court carefully limited
such intrusive review to the unique context of an earlier case
that involved a classification that was based on wealth and
144. Id. (citing Coulter v. State, 93 Wash. 2d 205, 608 P.2d 261 (1980)).
145. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, amended, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).
146. Id. at 643, 771 P.2d at 715.
147. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)).
148. The United States Supreme Court has also been very reluctant to apply
heightened or intermediate scrutiny to any new classifications. See Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2487-88 (1988).
149. 93 Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980).
150. Id. at 336, 610 P.2d at 874.
151. Id. at 336 n.2., 610 P.2d at 874 n.2.
152. Id. at 337, 610 P.2d at 875.
153. 107 Wash. 2d 512, 730 P.2d 1321 (1986).
154. Id. at 517-19, 730 P.2d at 1324-25.
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entailed an additional deprivation of liberty. 55 In that earlier
case, In re Phelan,56 the court had used an intermediate level
of scrutiny to review a denial of credit for presentence jail time
against a minimum sentence because the following interests
were implicated: (1) a "deprivation of liberty in addition to
that which would otherwise exist" (the failure to credit
presentence jail time effectively lengthened the incarceration
beyond the actual sentence) and (2) "a classification based
solely on wealth" (persons unable to post bail remained in jail
while those with adequate security were released pending
trial).'5 7 The Mayner court's literal construction of Phelan and
its restriction of heightened scrutiny to the precise blend of
factors present in that case makes it clear that the court
viewed Phelan as anomalous and was reluctant to extend the
use of heightened scrutiny beyond that unique context.158
The Mayner court also recognized the strong policy rea-
sons for adhering to a rational basis test in adjudicating equal
protection challenges to most statutes. Liberal application of
heightened scrutiny, the court feared, would lead to "judicial
activism in areas of legislative concern" and to "increased judi-
cial review of legislative enactments" across a range of
subjects.
59
The Mayner court's concerns are forcefully illustrated in
the present controversy. Advocates of elevated scrutiny argue
that the right to recovery in tort is a significant or important
right warranting heightened protection because the money
recovered may be "fundamental to the injured person's physi-
cal well-being and ability to continue to live a decent life."' 0
If elevated scrutiny were to be triggered whenever a monetary
benefit is "fundamental" to a person's "physical well-being and
ability to continue to live a decent life," then many areas of
155. Id. (citing State v. Phelan, 100 Wash. 2d 508, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983)).
156. 100 Wash. 2d 508, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983).
157. Id. at 514, 671 P.2d at 1215; see also In re Mayner, 107 Wash. 2d at 517, 730
P.2d at 1324 (describing specific ruling in Phelan); In re Borders, 114 Wash. 2d 171, 175,
786 P.2d 789, 792 (1990) (same).
158. Mayner, 107 Wash. 2d at 517-19, 730 P.2d at 1324-25; see also State v. Schaaf,
109 Wash. 2d 1, 21, 743 P.2d 240, 250 (1987) (the court indicated that intermediate
review was to be applied sparingly, saying "[w]e deem it unwise to apply the
heightened scrutiny test where the statute in question does not directly implicate
physical liberty.").
159. See In re Mayner, 107 Wash. 2d at 519, 730 P.2d at 1325.
160. Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 814, 539 P.2d 845, 848
(1975).
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concern previously left to the discretion of the legislature will
soon be swept into the courtroom.
Legislative enactments relating to welfare or other benefit
programs, crime victim's compensation, or workers' compensa-
tion, as examples, also involve benefits that may be vital to the
economic survival and well-being of individuals. Yet these sub-
jects of legislation have long been recognized as quintessential
examples of economic and social legislation subject only to
rational basis review.161 If the proponents of heightened scru-
tiny of tort legislation were to prevail, a plethora of economic
and social concerns would be endowed with constitutional sta-
tus and subjected to exacting, substantive judicial evaluation.
The end result would be to "constitutionalize" much of what
has traditionally been within the legislative province. Such a
radical shift in the balance of governmental responsibilities
should not be undertaken.'62
C. Application of Equal Protection Test
Underlying the rational basis test "is the notion that the
party challenging the classification has the heavy burden of
overcoming the presumption of a statute's constitutionality.'
163
The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that "[tlhe legisla-
ture's discretion in making classes is wide and, when a statu-
tory classification is challenged, facts are presumed sufficient
to justify it. The burden is on the challenger to prove that the
classification does not rest on a reasonable basis.""
Detractors of the modified joint and several liability rule
contend that four general "classifications" have been invalidly
created by section 4.22.070:
(1) the distinction between "innocent" and culpable plaintiffs
for purposes of determining whether a limited form of joint
and several liability applies to the defendants;
161. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(retirement benefits); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare benefits);
Johnson v. Tradewell Stores, 95 Wash. 2d 739, 630 P.2d 441 (1981) (industrial insurance
program); Haddenham v. State, 87 Wash. 2d 145, 550 P.2d 9 (1976) (crime victims'
compensation).
162. See also Redish, supra note 72, at 776 (apart from suspect class categories
calling for heightened scrutiny under equal protection, "it is dangerous for the
generally unrepresentative judiciary to veto fundamental social policy judgments
formulated by the representative units of government" (footnote omitted)).
163. Yakima County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 92 Wash. 2d 831,
835, 601 P.2d 936, 938 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 979 (1980).
164. Id. at 835-36. 601 P.2d at 938 (citations omitted).
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(2) the distinction between defendants acting concurrently and
defendants acting in concert or in an agency relationship for
purposes of determining whether a defendant may be held
responsible for the conduct of another;
(3) the distinction between defendants and other nonparty
entities also responsible for the injury in applying the limited
joint and several liability rule; and
(4) the distinctions drawn by the three exceptions to the stat-
ute for hazardous waste torts, business torts, and market-share
liability cases.
There are reasonable, indeed quite substantial, bases for
these four classifications. Each is based upon legitimate and
important distinctions properly taken into account in the statu-
tory scheme.
1. Distinction Between "Innocent" and Culpable Plaintiffs
Under subsection 4.22.070(1)(b),' 65 the general rule that
defendants are only severally liable for their proportionate
share of the total fault is set aside when the plaintiff suffering
bodily injury or incurring property damages was not at fault
for his own damages.
It is difficult to conceive of a distinction more appropri-
ately taken into account in adopting a liability scheme than the
one between plaintiffs who were and who were not contribu-
torily negligent. Certainly the Washington Legislature could
reasonably regard culpable plaintiffs as "different in relevant
respects" from "innocent" plaintiffs.166 Indeed, the principles
of equal protection are not truly implicated since culpable
plaintiffs are not in any sense similarly situated to those plain-
tiffs who bear no responsibility for their injuries.
The substantial nature of this distinction is confirmed by
the great weight placed upon it at common law. As discussed
above,167 a plaintiff at common law who was contributorily
negligent, however slightly, was barred from any recovery.
Yet it could not seriously be maintained that the common law
contributory negligence rule-which distinguished between
innocent and culpable plaintiffs for the crucial purpose of
determining whether any recovery was to be allowed--consti-
165. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1989).
166. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2235
(1988).
167. See supra notes 18 and 59 and accompanying text.
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tuted a deprivation of equal protection. If the significant dif-
ference between culpable and nonculpable plaintiffs was
justifiably considered at common law as the basis upon which
the very right to recover turned, surely it was not inappropri-
ate for the legislature to take this same difference in blame-
worthiness into account in determining when joint and several
liability would be preserved.
2. Distinction Between Defendants Acting Concurrently and
Defendants Acting in Concert or in an Agency
Relationship
For defendants who have acted concurrently or succes-
sively in bringing about an injury to a plaintiff, section 4.22.070
abolishes or modifies the doctrine of joint and several liability.
However, under subsection 4.22.070(1)(a), 168 a party may still
be held liable for the fault of another person when the parties
are "acting in concert" or when that other person is "acting as
an agent or servant of the party." This provision reflects the
legislature's understanding that a party is appropriately held
responsible for truly indivisible wrongs committed in concert
and for those torts committed by one who acts as an agent or
servant for another party.
As discussed earlier,169 the joint and several liability rule
originated in the context of tortfeasors who acted in concert to
bring about an injury. In such a case, the wrong that was com-
mitted and the injury that occurred were truly indivisible.
Since both parties acted purposefully together, it would make
little sense to attempt to apportion fault between them. The
legislature's determination to hold parties acting in concert
responsible for each other's conduct is thus manifestly justi-
fied; this rule simply recognizes a practical limitation on the
ability to apportion fault among tortfeasors.
Holding a principal or master vicariously liable for the
conduct of his agent or servant is likewise a justified departure
from the general principle of several liability. It is the agency
or servant relationship, quite distinct from the ordinary rela-
tionship among tortfeasors, that calls for a different rule of lia-
bility here. It would be a strange and indefensible abrogation
of the law of agency to provide for several liability in this
unique context.
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1989).
169. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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3. Distinction Between Defendants and Nonparties
Detractors of the statutory modification of joint and sev-
eral liability also contend that it is a deprivation of equal pro-
tection to prevent a plaintiff, who has not been contributorily
negligent, from collecting from a defendant the share of dam-
ages attributable to the actions of a nonparty entity.170 Under
subsection 4.22.070(1)(b),171 only a limited form of joint and
several liability is preserved where the plaintiff is not at fault.
Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the sum of
the proportionate shares of all party defendants, but no
defendant is obligated to pay that share of damages attributa-
ble to the conduct of another entity that has not been joined as
a party to the lawsuit.
To begin with, the distinction between parties and nonpar-
ties is largely a false classification for equal protection pur-
poses. Under subsection 4.22.070(1)(b), joint and several
liability is limited to that portion of the damages attributable
to those who are named as defendants to the action. With
three primary exceptions discussed below, however, a plaintiff
has the power to make any entity a party to the action. If a
plaintiff, for whatever reason, voluntarily chooses not to name
some responsible entity as a defendant to a case, there is no
basis to complain if that entity's share of the damages is not
awarded. Plaintiffs cannot properly challenge a classification
which they themselves can easily change.
There are three principal exceptions:1 72  (1) entities
released from liability by the plaintiff, (2) entities immune
170. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 240-41.
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1989).
172. In addition to these three principal exceptions to the plaintiff's power to
make any entity'a defendant, there is also the scenario of the "phantom" or unknown
tortfeasor, see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text, and the possibility that
personal jurisdiction could not be obtained over a responsible entity residing outside of
the state. However, as with the other exceptions, the fact that such entities are
unavailable to be made parties to a lawsuit is not engendered by section 4.22.070. In
any tort lawsuit, whether involving multiple defendants or not, a plaintiff may be
unable to find or identify the entity responsible for an injury or be unable to assert
personal jurisdiction over a putative defendant. Those circumstances are not created
by the statute at issue here. Moreover, with respect to the question of personal
jurisdiction, the problem is likely an illusory one. As Professor Peck has stated,
"considering the broad interpretation which the Washington Court has given to the
Washington long-arm statute, is it [sic] unlikely that an entity outside the state could
not be made subject to the personal jurisdiction of a Washington court." Peck, supra
note 5, at 696 (citing Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction in
Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1975)).
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from liability to the plaintiff, and (3) entities with an individ-
ual defense against the plaintiff. None of these limitations on
amenability to suit are created by section 4.22.070, and the
equal protection challenge is thus misdirected.
The first exception, like the general distinction between
parties and nonparties, comes about only through the volun-
tary actions of a plaintiff. If a plaintiff voluntarily settles with
one or more defendants, or decides simply to release a respon-
sible entity, that plaintiff is hardly in a position to demand that
the share of damages attributable to the released entities be
imposed on others. The plaintiff remains free to refuse a
release and, instead, retain that entity as a party.
As for the other two exceptions, for immune entities and
for those with an individual defense, 17 3 the inability to prose-
cute a tort action against such entities is not created by the
statute at issue here. Although subsection 4.22.070(1)(b) may
limit the joint and several liability obligation to the sum of the
damages attributable to those made party defendants, the stat-
ute does not, in and of itself, create any obstacles to joining
every responsible entity as a party to the action. The real
problem emanates from the barriers to party status created by
statutes that provide immunity or create individual defenses.
Thus, the true complaint lies not with section 4.22.070 but with
these other provisions of law.
11 4
Moreover, any consideration of equal protection principles
must take into account equal and fair treatment of the defend-
ant as well as the tort plaintiff. As explained earlier,'75 basic
indicia of fairness do not lead to the conclusion that an individ-
ual defendant should be obligated to pay that portion of dam-
ages attributable to the conduct of another entity simply
because, for whatever reason, a plaintiff is unable to hold that
other entity accountable. In upholding Colorado's abolition of
173. As noted earlier in the substantive due process section, see supra notes 84-85
and accompanying text, the availability of an individual defense to an entity that may
be partially responsible for the injury is usually attributable to the actions or omissions
of the plaintiff. For example, if a plaintiff sleeps on his rights and fails to timely file
an action against an entity before the statute of limitations runs, the plaintiff is
properly held accountable for this failure. There is no equitable basis to shift any loss
caused by the plaintiff's neglect to other defendants in the action.
174. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1465,
1466-67 (D. Colo. 1989) (complaint about inability to recover share of damages
attributable to conduct of immune entities should be directed to immunity statutes,
not to abolition of joint and several liability).
175. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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joint and several liability against an equal protection challenge
in In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Air-
port,'7 6 a federal district court ruled that "[t]he statutory effect
of shifting the loss caused by an immune tortfeasor to the
plaintiff is rationally related to the legitimate government
interest in requiring defendants to pay no more than their
judicially determined share of the loss.""' Indeed, now that
the common law theory of indivisible wrongs has been aban-
doned in favor of the modern approach of comparative fault,
imposition of liability on a defendant beyond his proportionate
share of fault begins to look punitive in nature.
4. Distinctions Based on the Three Statutory Exceptions
Finally, equal protection attacks could be made upon the
three specific exceptions to the modification of joint and sev-
eral liability in subsection 4.22.070(3).78 There are, however,
very substantial rationales behind each of these exceptions.
The first exception provides: "Nothing in this section
affects any cause of action relating to hazardous wastes or sub-
stances or solid waste disposal sites."' 79 One commentator has
described the basis for this exception as follows:
The first exception to abolishment of joint and several liabil-
ity, causes of action relating to hazardous wastes of sub-
stances or sold waste disposal sites, is the result of the
legislature's intent to maintain an incentive for large busi-
nesses to contribute to a funding mechanism similar to the
Environmental Protection Agency Superfund for hazardous
waste clean-up. The potential of joint liability for this type
of tortious conduct will presumably instill into these busi-
nesses a willingness to create and fund a state-wide system
by which hazardous waste pollution can be cleaned up. The
fund would also be used to defray the clean-up costs of a
landfill in which hazardous wastes were deposited.18
0
176. 720 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1989).
177. Id. at 1467.
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1989).
179. Id. § 4.22.070(3)(a).
180. Comment, supra note 5, at 242-43 (footnotes omitted); see also S. Journal,
49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. at 467 (1986); Peck, supra note 14, at 250, 251 (1987).
In Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, amended, 780 P.2d 260
(1989), the Washington Supreme Court, citing the plain and unqualified language of
subsection 4 .22.070(3)(a), broadly construed the hazardous waste exception to apply
whenever hazardous substances, wherever found, are a factor in the tortious injury.
Id. at 668-69, 771 P.2d at 727-28. By taking the exception beyond the legislature's
concerns with environmental pollution and the proposed "Superfund" toxic waste
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The second exception reads: "Nothing in this section shall
affect a cause of action arising from the tortious interference
with contracts or business relations." '181 The same commenta-
tor also explained this exception as follows:
The assumption that people do not buy insurance for negli-
gent business transactions led to the enactment of the excep-
tion concerning tortious interference with contracts.
Therefore, there would be no impact on insurance rates
from this exception. Thus, an exception for this class will
not have an impact on insurance affordability or
availability. 8 2
In addition, the legislature was concerned not to interfere with
the development of unique principles of law in the distinctive
category of business torts.1
8 3
The third exception reads: "Nothing in this section shall
affect any cause of action arising from the manufacture or
marketing of a fungible product in a generic form which con-
tains no clearly identifiable shape, color, or marking."'" 8 The
purpose of this provision was to preserve the market-share
approach to liability8 5 adopted by the Washington Supreme
Court in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories.8 6 In this type of case,
it may not be possible to ascertain which of several manufac-
turers of a generic and fungible product, specifically drugs,
produced the particular batch or dosage that injured the indi-
vidual plaintiff. In cases such as these, if a plaintiff is to be
compensated at all, the Washington court concluded it was nec-
essary to hold all manufacturers liable for their share of the
market for that product.'87 Accordingly, this third exception is
not really an exception at all since a market-share, rather than
a joint and several liability approach, has been applied in such
cleanup bill, the Washington Supreme Court's broader construction may slip the
exception from its moorings to a rational and narrow purpose. To the extent this is
the case, the court may need to revisit the issue in the future and revive a narrower
interpretation to ensure the constitutional validity of the exception.
181. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(b) (1989).
182. Comment, supra note 5, at 243; see also S. Journal, supra note 180, at 468;
Peck, supra note 14, at 251.
183. S. Journal, supra note 180, at 468.
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(c) (1989).
185. Comment, supra note 5, at 243; see also S. Journal, supra note 180, at 468;
Peck, supra note 14, at 251.
186. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
187. Id. at 602-07, 689 P.2d at 381-83. See generally Comment, Into the Quagmire:
Washington Adopts Market Share Liability in DES Cases, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 199 (1985/
86).
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situations. The exception simply preserves the state of the law
as it previously applied to this unique category of cases.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that "the legisla-
ture is allowed a wide discretion in the selection of classes" in
the enactment of statutes. 8 Moreover, there is no deprivation
of equal protection "merely because classifications made by...
laws are imperfect"'8 9 or because the categories are "unartfully
drawn."'" As shown by the legislative purpose behind each of
these exceptions outlined above, a substantial rationale war-
rants treating these cases differently and defining the excep-
tions in this manner.'9 ' The legislature's discretion in adopting
these exceptions was well exercised.
Moreover, even if these three exceptions were susceptible
to attack, the challenge would more appropriately come from
defendants asserting a deprivation of equal protection by the
application of an exception to remove a case from the general
several liability rule. It is not plaintiffs who are aggrieved by
these exceptions but rather defendants in hazardous waste or
business tort cases who may lose the protections and equitable
treatment afforded by the limitation of joint and several liabil-
ity. And, in any event, as one commentator has concluded,
"even if a successful equal protection attack is made, the result
is more likely to be an invalidation of the exceptions than an
invalidation of" section 4.22.070 as a whole. 92
188. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wash.
2d 523, 530, 520 P.2d 162, 167 (1974).
189. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1596 (1989) (citing Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970)).
190. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
191. Comment, supra note 5, at 248-49.
192. Peck, supra note 14, at 252. Even if one part of a statute is unconstitutional,
the remainder will stand "unless the invalid provisions are unseverable and it cannot
reasonably be believed that the legislature would have passed the one without the
other, or unless the elimination of the invalid part would render the remainder of the
act incapable of accomplishing the legislative purposes." State v. Anderson, 81 Wash.
2d 234, 236, 501 P.2d 184, 185-86 (1972). The presence of a severability clause in the
statute is given great weight as "assurance to the court that it may properly sustain the
separation sections or provisions of a partially invalid act without hesitation or doubt
as to whether the legislature would have adopted the valid portion had they been
advised of the invalidity of the affected part." Id. at 236, 501 P.2d at 186. The Tort
Reform Act of 1986 does contain a severability clause. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch.
305, § 911, 1986 Wash. Laws 1367. Moreover, given the overwhelming support for tort
reform in general and modification of joint and several liability in particular shown in
the legislative history, it cannot reasonably be doubted that the legislature would have
enacted section 4.22.070 without the three exceptions had it anticipated that the
exceptions would be found invalid. See H. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. at
1068-69, 1082 (1986) (adoption of amendment with present language of section 4.22.070
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D. Alternative Approach Based on Washington Privileges
and Immunities ause
Although the Washington Supreme Court has consistently
followed the equal protection approach of the United States
Supreme Court in interpreting the Washington privileges and
immunities clause, the Washington Constitution does not con-
tain an equal protection clause as such. Instead, article I, sec-
tion 12 prohibits the granting by law of "privileges or
immunities" to any "citizen, class of citizens, or corporation"
which "upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all cit-
izens or corporations. "193
Because of this difference of language, some detractors of
tort reform suggest that a construction of this "privileges and
immunities" clause that should be adopted which differs from
that applied under the federal equal protection provision. 94
Not surprisingly, these commentators believe such a different
interpretation would lead to the application of a higher level of
judicial scrutiny in examining the modification of joint and
several liability. That does not, however, appear to be the case.
At the time of the Washington constitutional convention
in 1889, two clauses of the United States Constitution protected
the "privileges and immunities" of citizens. Both provisions,
which it may be assumed were within the contemplation of the
by a vote of 65-32 after debate focusing on the joint and several liability issue); id at
1082 (final passage of bill by a vote of 66-31); S. Journal, supra note 180, at 498 (initial
passage by vote of 32-13, final passage by vote of 31-16).
193. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
194. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 204-11.
In State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), the Washington Supreme
Court articulated six neutral and nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining
whether to adopt an interpretation of a state constitutional provision independent of
the analytical framework developed for its federal counterpart. Id. at 58-63, 720 P.2d
at 811-13. These six criteria are: "(1) textual language, (2) differences in the texts, (3)
constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences, and (6)
matters of particular state or local concern." Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811. The wording of
article I, § 12, referring to "privileges or immunities," obviously differs from the
language of equal protection, although it does find parallels in other provisions of the
federal Constitution. There apparently is no historical record of what the
constitutional framers intended by the adoption of the state privileges and immunities
clause, although it may be doubted that the common law doctrine of joint and several
liability, which had not yet been recognized in Washington, was included among the
list of protected "privileges." And the fact that the federal Constitution "is a grant of
enumerated powers to the federal government" while the state constitution "serves to
limit the sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in the
elected representatives," id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812, does not help give substance to this
particular state constitutional provision.
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Washington convention, have been rather narrowly construed.
In the early case of State v. Vance,195 the Washington Supreme
Court referred to the state privileges and immunities clause
and said "[b]y analogy these words as used in the state consti-
tution should receive a like definition and interpretation as
that applied to them when interpreting the federal
Constitution."196
The "privileges and immunities" clause in article IV, sec-
tion 2 of the federal Constitution 97 prohibits a state from dis-
criminating against citizens of other states with respect to
"fundamental" rights of state citizenship.19 Disparity of treat-
ment between residents and nonresidents with respect to such
"privileges and immunities" is permitted only for "substantial
reason[s]."' Similarly, the "privileges and immunities" clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion200 protects United States citizens from abrogation by any
state of those rights which are fundamental to the citizens of a
free government, such as the right to travel freely from state
to state, to vote, and to petition the Congress for redress of
grievances.20'
Accordingly, the phrase "privileges and immunities" has
been viewed as describing those fundamental attributes of citi-
zenship essential to a free society. By contrast, the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment is a broader,
although more limited, protection. Whereas those few funda-
mental rights of citizens that qualify as "privileges and immu-
nities" may be entitled to more substantial protection from
infringement, equal protection requires equal treatment in all
respects unless a reasonable basis exists for differentiation.
The Washington Supreme Court has extended the privileges
and immunities clause beyond federal equal protection analysis
only where fundamental rights-such as voting rights, physical
195. 29 Wash. 435, 70 P. 34 (1902).
196. Id. at 458, 70 P. at 41.
197. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the Several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
198. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 378-88 (1978).
199. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
200. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
201. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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liberty, or women's rights-were at issue.2 °2 As Justice Jack-
son said, "instances of valid 'privileges and immunities' must
be but few.
2 ° s
One law review commentary20 4 suggests giving substance
to the state privileges and immunities clause by reference to
Justice Cooley's definition in his 1883 treatise of "privileges
and immunities" as employed in article IV, section 2 of the fed-
eral Constitution.0 5 Justice Cooley's definition was para-
phrased in the Washington Supreme Court's early discussion of
the state privileges and immunities clause in State v. Vance.2°
In his treatise, Justice Cooley describes "privileges and immu-
nities" in this way:
Although the precise meaning of "privileges and immuni-
ties" is not very conclusively settled as yet, it appears to be
conceded that the Constitution secures in each State to the
citizens of all other States the right to remove to, and carry
on business therein; the right by the usual modes to acquire
and hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the
law; the right to the usual remedies for the collection of
debts and the enforcement of other personal rights, and the
right to be exempt, in property and person, from taxes or
burdens which the property, or persons, of citizens of the
same State are not subject to.
20 7
Accepting Justice Cooley's definition as an authoritative
source, 2 08 however, does not lead to any conclusion that com-
mon law tort doctrines have been endowed with the status of
protected "privileges and immunities." Even his references to
202. See O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash. 2d 796, 813 n.6, 749 P.2d 142, 151-52 n.6
(1988).
203. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
204. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 205-06.
205. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (5th ed. 1883).
206. 29 Wash. 435, 458, 70 P. 34, 41 (1902).
207. T. COOLEY, supra note 205, at 491-92.
208. It is not wise to place too much weight upon Justice Cooley's definition. It is
derived from Justice Bushrod Washington's discussion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230), in which he was sitting as a circuit justice. Justice
Washington's definition reflected "notions of 'natural rights,'" Baldwin v. Montana
Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978), that is, the theory that "without
specific constitutional moorings, posited certain vital principles in our free republican
government, which will determine and overrule an apparent abuse of legislative
powers." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 405-06 (1978) (footnote omitted).
This "natural rights" view was discarded before the adoption of the Washington
Constitution in 1889. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); see also
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 n.10 (1985).
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the right "to protect and defend [property] in the law" and
"the right to the usual remedies for . . . the enforcement of
other personal rights,"2" propose nothing more than a general
right of equal access to the courts to seek remedies according
to the law. Nothing in Justice Cooley's definition suggests that
substantive common law tort principles should be elevated to a
preeminent position in the hierarchy of constitutional rights.21 °
Moreover, in Washington, it has already been established
that a person has no right or "privilege" in the continuation of
any rule of the common law.21' Certainly the common law
doctrine of joint and several liability cannot be regarded as a
constitutional right or "privilege" when it was not even recog-
nized as part of Washington tort law until some twenty years
after the adoption of the state constitution.21 2 The assertion
that common law tort doctrines qualify for special treatment as
vital constitutional "privileges" appears to "spring . . . from
pure intuition" based on familiarity with and the perceived
value of such rules rather than from an anchored process of
constitutional analysis "that is at once articulable, reasonable
and reasoned.
2 1 3
Thus, in the end, an approach that focuses upon the partic-
ular language of the state privileges and immunities clause
ultimately leads to the same result as does equal protection
analysis in the case of tort liability modification. Perhaps it is
for this reason that, in general, the Washington Supreme
Court's "interpretation of the State's privileges and immunities
clause.., has followed the federal interpretation of the equal
209. T. COOLEY, supra note 205, at 491-92.
210. Moreover, since Justice Cooley also refers to rights to "carry on business," "to
acquire and hold property," and to "collection of debts," as among those protected by
the federal "privileges and immunities" clause, T. COOLEY, supra note 205, at 491-92, a
broad reading of this discussion would require giving heightened scrutiny to a host of
other laws regulating business, property, and creditor-debtor relationships. Instead,
Justice Cooley is better understood as simply saying, on a level of generality, that
equal treatment and a fair right of access and opportunity must be allowed, not that
substantive principles of tort or property law must be accorded constitutional status.
211. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
212. The doctrine of joint and several liability appears to have been first adopted
in Washington in the 1909 case of Nelson v. Bromley, 55 Wash. 256, 104 P. 251 (1909).
The fact that this doctrine was not expressly acknowledged as part of Washington's
common law at the time of the 1889 constitutional convention significantly undermines
the theory that joint and several liability is a "privilege" within the meaning of article
I, § 12. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 62, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986)
("[pireexisting [state] law can... help to define the scope of a constitutional right later
established").
213. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 63, 720 P.2d at 813.
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protection clause. 2 14 An analysis based on the different lan-
guage of the state provision does not appear to either improve
much upon or add appreciably to the federal approach in terms
of the practical results likely to be reached.
E. Oregon's Interpretation of Its State Privileges and
Immunities Clause
Of the many states with a privileges and immunities clause
in their state constitutions, only Oregon has adopted a con-
struction of such a provision that fails to adhere to federal
equal protection analysis.2 1 At least some of the members of
the Washington Supreme Court appear to be quite intrigued by
Oregon's approach. When the constitutionality of the damages
cap provision in the Tort Reform Act of 1986 was before the
court in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corporation,1 6 the parties were
requested to file supplemental briefs discussing "how or
whether the Oregon court's methodology" for construing Ore-
gon's privileges and immunities clause should affect the Wash-
ington court's analysis. 7 The court ultimately decided the
Sofie case on grounds other than the privileges and immunities
clause; however, the court outlined Oregon's approach in dicta
in a footnote218 and suggested that this analysis might be rele-
vant if the question arose in another case.21 9
Although Oregon has not yet formulated a precise meth-
odology for its variant approach,2 2 ° the Oregon Supreme Court
has given a construction to its "privileges and immunities"
clause 22 ' that is both narrower and broader than the historical
sense of the phrase would suggest. Rather than limiting the
214. Snyder v. Munro, 106 Wash. 2d 380, 386, 721 P.2d 962, 965 (1986).
215. Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities'" A State's Version
of Equal Protection, 13 VT. L. REV. 222, 225-26 (1988).
216. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, amended, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).
217. Letter from Steven P. Helgeson, deputy clerk of the Washington Supreme
Court, to counsel in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 54610-0 (Sept. 26, 1988) (inviting
counsel to review the Schuman article, supra note 215, and "submit supplementary
briefs explaining how or whether the Oregon court's methodology should affect [its]
analysis of the issues in light of the factors discussed in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d
54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986)").
218. Soeie, 112 Wash. 2d at 642-43 n.2, 771 P.2d at 714-15 n.2.
219. Id. at 642, 771 P.2d at 714.
220. Schuman, supra note 215, at 229.
221. The Oregon provision is virtually identical to the Washington clause and
reads: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." OR.
CONST. art. I, § 20.
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phrase "privileges and immunities" to certain fundamental
rights of citizenship, the Oregon court regularly invokes the
state constitutional provision whenever a statute affects "some
advantage" to which a person "would be entitled but for a
choice made by a government authority."22 2 However, the pro-
tection accorded to such "privileges and immunities" is more
diffuse; absolute or heightened protection is not invariably
accorded to "privileges and immunities" so broadly defined.
Except for statutory classifications which invidiously discrimi-
nate against classes of people based on immutable personal
characteristics, 223 the Oregon courts are deferential to the
choices made by the political branches of government.2 2 4 The
Oregon approach tends to be one of judicial restraint that
accords the legislature broad discretion in drawing lines within
statutes to implement policy choices. 22 5
In adopting its unique analysis of the state "privileges and
immunities" clause, the Oregon Supreme Court neglected to
consider the contemporary understanding of the term "privi-
leges and immunities" when the Oregon Constitution was
adopted in 1859. The court instead looked to the general histor-
ical context in which the Oregon "privileges and immunities"
clause arose: "Antedating the Civil War and the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects
early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges
for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Con-
gress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or
groups.""2 2 Notwithstanding the Oregon court's view of the
clause's origination as a bar to the granting of special privileges
or monopolies to powerful interests, the court has also
extended its protective effects to rights against adverse dis-
crimination as well.2 2 7
In theory, the Oregon approach evaluates the nature of
the classification established in a statute and applies defined
222. City of Salem v. Bruner, 299 Or. 262, 267, 702 P.2d 70, 74 (1985).
223. Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 294 Or. 33, 42, 653 P.2d 970, 977-78
(1982).
224. Gale v. Department of Revenue, 293 Or. 221, 646 P.2d 27 (1982).
225. City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 747, 750, 619 P.2d 217, 227 (1980)
("[flundamentally, classification is a matter committed to the discretion of the
legislature and the courts will not interfere with the legislative judgment unless it is
palpably arbitrary").
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rules depending upon the type of classification. If the law
results in "disparate treatment of persons or groups by virtue
of characteristics which they have apart from the law in ques-
tion, '228 then the statute is viewed as operating upon a "true"
class of people.2  Ordinarily, this analysis is restricted to those
groups of people who "share relevant traits, which are widely
regarded as significant personal, ethnic or social characteris-
tics. '230 However, the Oregon courts have also applied this
prong of the analysis to less invariable characteristics, even
legal categories defined by other statutes, which exist apart
from the particular law under challenge.2a '
Section 4.22.070 of the Washington Revised Code, for
example, distinguishes between contributorily negligent and
innocent plaintiffs and between parties and non-parties in
determining whether and to whom joint and several liability
applies. Although these lines are not drawn on the basis of
ethnic or social factors, the statute may nevertheless be said to
affect a "true" class because culpability and party status exist
independently of the statute.232 However, even when a "true"
class is implicated, the Oregon courts will still sustain the clas-
sification unless the additional element of "invidious discrimi-
nation," generally against a class based on immutable personal
characteristics, such as race or gender, is present.23 a
If a group of people is categorized as a class only by virtue
of the particular statute being challenged, the Oregon
approach "requires that the government decision to offer or
deny the advantage [the "privilege and immunity"] be made
228. Id. at 239, 630 P.2d at 816; see also Northwest Advancement, Inc. v. State
Bureau of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, 96 Or. App. 133, 142, 772 P.2d 934, 941
(1989).
229. Schuman, supra note 215, at 230-37.
230. Id. at 237.
231. See, e.g., Northwest Advancement, Inc., 96 Or. App. at 141, 772 P.2d at 941
(class of newspaper vendors and carriers); Jungen v. State, 94 Or. App. 101, 105, 764
P.2d 938, 941 (1988) (category of those who receive workers' compensation under
another statute), review denied, 307 Or. 658, 772 P.2d 1341, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 322
(1989). However, the Oregon Supreme Court's latest statement on the matter appears
to reserve the "true" class analysis for those categories based upon "antecedent
personal or social characteristics or societal status," that is, factors by which a person is
"singled out from the general population." Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 520,
783 P.2d 506, 516 (1989).
232. But see supra note 231 (discussing Hale v. Port of Portland).
233. Northwest Advancement Inc., 96 Or. App. at 141, 772 P.2d at 941; Jungen, 94
Or. App. at 105, 764 P.2d at 941.
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'by permissible criteria and consistently applied.' ,24 In other
words, the statute affecting an "advantage" must employ
"objective, consistent, and impersonal" criteria in demarcating
the statutory classification.235
To continue the example, the distinctions drawn in section
4.22.070 based on the culpability of the plaintiff or the party
status of the alleged tortfeasor do turn on "objective, consis-
tent, and impersonal criteria" as determined on the facts of
each case. The comparative fault of a party is adjudged by an
impartial trier of fact based on reasonably objective criteria in
the form of factual evidence. Assuming that a plaintiff desires
to make an entity a party defendant, the susceptibility of that
entity to suit turns upon "objective, consistent, and impersonal
criteria" established by statutes defining immunities or individ-
ual defenses. In any event, as demonstrated above, it cannot
plausibly be maintained that the classifications purportedly
created by section 4.22.070 are "wholly irrational '236 or "palpa-
bly arbitrary. ' 237
While the invocation of the state "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause allows the Oregon courts the freedom to reach
results at variance with the United States Supreme Court's
equal protection rulings, it is not apparent that this occurs with
any frequency or that the Oregon approach requires, rather
than merely permits, a contrary outcome. Indeed, while differ-
ent labels and language are employed, most of the analysis
applied by the Oregon courts under the heading of "privileges
and immunities" would be equally at home in the context of an
equal protection examination.
The Oregon approach, while interesting, can be seen as
simply a variant upon and not at odds with equal protection
analysis. Although the Oregon courts purport to have forsaken
any weighing of interests in favor of neutral application of
defined rules, 23 8 the element of balancing inevitably comes
234. City of Salem v. Bruner, 299 Or. 262, 269, 702 P.2d 70, 74 (1985) (quoting State
v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 377, 667 P.2d 509, 516 (1983)).
235. Schuman, supra note 215, at 239; see also State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 238, 630
P.2d 810, 816 ("[a]ttacks on... laws.., have generally been rejected whenever the law
leaves it open to anyone to bring himself or herself within the favored class on equal
terms"), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
236. Gale v. Department of Revenue, 293 Or. 221, 228, 646 P.2d 27, 33 (1982).
237. City of Klamath Falls v. Winter, 289 Or. 757, 769, 619 P.2d 217, 227 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 964 (1981).
238. Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 526, 783 P.2d 506, 516 (1989); State v.
Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 266, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983); Schuman, supra note 215, at 244.
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back in, even if somewhat disguised. For example, not every
"true" or "suspect" classification is impermissible. The court
will explore whether the classification is "invidious," that is,
"whether the government's system of classification... reflects
prejudiced or stereotypical thinking."'2 9 This examination of
the purpose or intent of the classification must be regarded as
a balancing of factors, akin to considering whether the classifi-
cation is justified by a compelling or important purpose. Simi-
larly, when statutorily-created classifications or "true" classes
not subject to "invidious" discrimination have been reviewed,
the permissibility of the lines drawn is often measured in
terms of rationality,240 an apparent reversion to traditional
equal protection analysis. Indeed, the equal protection ques-
tion-whether statutory lines have been rationally drawn-
should begin with the Oregon court's inquiry into whether the
classifications are made "by permissible criteria... [which are]
consistently applied.
' 241
In any event, even assuming that Oregon's approach could
be imported to Washington consistently with an historical
appreciation of the phrase "privileges and immunities" as
understood at the time of the framing of the Washington Con-
stitution in 1889, it would provide little solace to those seeking
to subject the statutory modification of joint and several liabil-
ity to exacting judicial scrutiny. The Oregon courts have
eschewed a "fundamental rights" analysis as part of that state's
equality guarantee and have declined to apply any form of
heightened review to statutes affecting the "privilege" of suing
for compensation for personal injury.242
VI. SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Commentators 243 point to the prohibition in article II, sec-
tion 28, clause 17 of the Washington Constitution against "pri-
239. Schuman, supra note 215, at 235; see also Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund
Corp., 294 Or. 33, 41, 653 P.2d 970, 977 (1982) (discussing "invidious" or "stereotypical"
thinking in context of gender classification).
240. E.g., McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or. App. 462, 469, 780 P.2d 239, 244 (1989);
Northwest Advancement, Inc. v. State Bureau of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, 96
Or. App. 133, 143, 772 P.2d 934, 940-41 (1989).
241. City of Salem v. Bruner, 299 Or. 262, 267, 702 P.2d 70, 74 (1985); State v.
Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 375, 667 P.2d 509, 516 (1983).
242. See e.g., Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 783 P.2d 506 (1989); Jungen v.
State, 94 Or. App. 101, 105, 764 P.2d 938, 940 (1988), review denied, 307 Or. 658, 772 P.2d
1341, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 322 (1989).
243. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 218-19, 242.
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vate or special laws . . . [f]or limitation of civil or criminal
actions" 24 4 as yet another basis for a constitutional challenge to
section 4.22.070. The Washington Supreme Court has defined
the term "special legislation" in this way:
A law is special in a constitutional sense, when, by force of
an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons,
places or things from others upon which, but for such limita-
tion, it would operate. The test of a special law is the appro-
priateness of its provisions to the objects that it excludes.
245
Because there are three defined exceptions to the general
modification of joint and several liability in section 4.22.070,
this "special legislation" provision may be implicated, but it is
not violated. The minimal standard is whether "any exclusions
from a statute's applicability ... [are] rationally related to the
purpose of the statute."
2 46
As explained in detail above,24 7 the three statutory excep-
tions are rationally, indeed substantially, justified. Further,
each was created for a purpose that is entirely compatible with
the objectives of the Tort Reform Act of 1986: to establish a
more equitable tort liability system and to increase the availa-
bility of liability insurance. In this context, then, a "special
legislation" challenge adds nothing to the equal protection
arguments.2 48
VII. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Detractors of section 4.22.070 also contend that the sub-
stantive modification of the joint and several liability doctrine
infringes upon separation of powers principles.2 49 Their argu-
ment appears to be that the judiciary possesses an inherent
244. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 28, cl. 17.
245. YMCA of Seattle v. Parish, 89 Wash. 495, 498, 154 P. 785 (1916) (citations
omitted); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n,
83 Wash. 2d 523, 537, 520 P.2d 162, 171 (1974).
246. Pfeifer v. City of Bellingham, 112 Wash. 2d 562, 570, 772 P.2d 1018, 1023 (1989)
(quoting City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 663, 675, 694 P.2d 641, 649 (1985)).
247. See supra notes 178-192 and accompanying text.
248. See Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash. 2d 107, 143,
744 P.2d 1032, 1057 (1987) (relying on rational basis equal protection analysis to reject
special legislation challenge to statute), amended, 750 P.2d 254, appeal dismissed, 109
S. Ct. 35 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n,
83 Wash. 2d 523, 537, 520 P.2d 162, 171 (following same line of analysis).
249. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 202-04, 243. But see Peck,
supra note 5, at 689-90 (concluding that the statutory modification of joint and several
liability is not likely to be viewed as an unconstitutional invasion of judicial powers).
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and inviolable power to award the full amount of damages suf-
fered by a plaintiff, even if additional liability is imposed
beyond a defendant's proportionate share of the damages. Not
surprisingly, there is no authority for this startling proposition.
Although the common law may traditionally have been
the product of judicial decisionmaking, it has long been estab-
lished that the legislature may effect changes in or outright
abrogation of the rules that obtained at common law.2 5° Wash-
ington courts have accepted legislative prescriptions instituting
significant changes in tort rules of liability and damage recov-
ery, causes of action, immunities, statutes of limitations, evi-
dentiary rules and presumptions, qualifications of witnesses
and subjects of testimony, testimonial privileges, and the dis-
cretion of courts.251
In Suburban Fuel Co. v. Lamoreaux,252 the Washington
Court of Appeals upheld against separation of powers attack a
statute that prohibited any award of damages to an unregis-
tered contractor seeking to enforce a construction contract.
The court rejected the argument that a statute unconstitution-
ally encroaches upon the judicial power because it directs a
change in the substantive law to be applied by the courts in
adjudicating lawsuits:
It is true that a change in substantive law or the abolition of
a right or cause of action otherwise existing prevents a court
from doing what it was able to do before the statute was
passed. However, such a change in substantive or procedural
law is not necessarily an unconstitutional impairment of
judicial function. Were the law otherwise, the legislature
250. See, e.g., Daggs v. City of Seattle, 110 Wash. 2d 49, 57, 750 P.2d 626, 630 (1988);
Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 962-63, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975); Shea v. Olson, 185
Wash. 143, 157, 53 P.2d 615, 622 (1936); see also supra notes 65-68 and 76-78 and
accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Godfrey, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (adoption of comparative
negligence); Shea, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (creating new immunity from tort
liability); Rodriguez v. Niemeyer, 23 Wash. App. 398, 595 P.2d 952 (1979) (statutes of
limitations); Miller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 302, 501 P.2d 1063 (1972)
(rules of evidence); State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984) (rules of
evidence in criminal cases); Adams v. Hinkle, 51 Wash. 2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958)
(presumptions); State v. Thomas, 58 Wash. 2d 746, 364 P.2d 920 (1961) (presumptions in
criminal cases); Campbell v. Campbell, 146 Wash. 478, 263 P. 957 (1928) (witnesses);
Cook v. King County, 9 Wash. App. 50, 510 P.2d 659 (1973) (testimonial privileges);
State v. Ammons, 105 Wash. 2d 175, 713 P.2d 719, amended, 718 P.2d 796 (Seritencing
Reform Act limiting discretion of judges in criminal sentencing), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
930 (1986).
252. 4 Wash. App. 179, 480 P.2d 216 (1971).
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would be powerless or seriously handicapped in exercising
its powers in accordance with developing needs.25 3
Those urging separation of powers flaws in section
4.22.070254 rely heavily upon the Washington Supreme Court's
decision in City of Tacoma v. O'Brien, 5 which held that a
statute mandating a particular legal ruling in a case violated
separation of powers principles. The statute at issue in O'Brien
effectively found that "existing contracts, entered into at least
six months prior to the legislation, have become economically
impossible to perform." '25 6 Thus, the legislature had statutorily
decreed an irrebutable presumption and applied it to pre-
existing contracts. In other words, the O'Brien court was con-
fronted with "a legislative finding that contracts entered into
prior to the legislation have become impossible to perform." '257
The legislature had, in effect, adjudicated the case, rather than
simply stating the rule of law which was to apply.2 5
By contrast, section 4.22.070 does not "dictate] how the
court should decide a factual issue [or] affectf a final judg-
ment" in a pending case.25 9 The statute does not adjudicate
any existing legal dispute; it merely modifies the common law
rule of joint and several liability and thereby changes the sub-
stantive law that will be applied in the future.
Changes in substantive law, even those that establish the
rule of decision in future litigation, have never been held to be
outside the legislative province. The legislature must be
accorded the authority necessary "to remedy defects in the
common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the
changes of time and circumstances. '260 Indeed, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court has declared that it is the legislature,
rather than the judiciary, which is most capable of making the
public policy judgments involved in assessing the merits of
comprehensive changes in the liability system which entail
broad societal impact.26 1
253. Id. at 181-82, 480 P.2d at 218.
254. Wiggins, Harnetiaux & Whaley, supra note 5, at 204.
255. 85 Wash. 2d 266, 534 P.2d 114 (1975).
256. Id. at 272, 534 P.2d at 117.
257. American Nat'l Can Ass'n v. State, 114 Wash. 2d 236, 252, 787 P.2d 545, 553
(1990).
258. Id.
259. Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash. 2d 107, 144, 744
P.2d 1032, 1058 (1987), amended, 750 P.2d 254, appeal dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 35 (1988).
260. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
261. Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 385-86, 755 P.2d 759, 761 (1988) (stating
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Finally, section 4.22.070 does not intrude upon the inher-
ent authority of the Washington Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure as established in State v. Smith.262 The
modification of joint and several liability is a substantive, not a
procedural, change in tort law, rights, and remedies.263 The
fact that new rules of procedure may be necessary to imple-
ment this substantive change in the law of tort liability raises
no separation of powers concerns.
VIII. SINGLE SUBJECT IN BILL
Article II, section 19 of the Washington Constitution pro-
vides: "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that
shall be express in the title.' '2 ' Although none of the com-
mentators in the legal literature have suggested this provision
as a basis for a constitutional challenge to section 4.22.070,
some plaintiffs have argued that the Tort Reform Act of 1986,
as a whole, is unduly comprehensive in scope because it deals
with both tort rules and liability insurance regulation 265 and
thus runs afoul of this constitutional limitation.
The "single subject" requirement of the state constitution
has been liberally construed by the Washington Supreme
Court.26 In the modern world, with an increasing awareness of
the interdependent and interrelated nature of so many aspects
of life and the world in which we live, the legislature must be
free to adopt broad and comprehensive legislation that
attempts to deal with numerous aspects of a single but many-
faceted problem. The "single subject" requirement must not
be interpreted so as to foster uncoordinated, piecemeal resolu-
tions of troublesome and complex matters; article II, section 19
was not intended "to so tie the hands of the legislature as to
that modification of the common law rule that social hosts are not liable for actions of
intoxicated quests should be left to legislature).
262. 84 Wash. 2d 498, 502, 527 P.2d 674, 677 (1974).
263. See id. at 501, 527 P.2d at 677 (contrasting "substantive law, rights and
remedies" with procedural rules pertaining "to the essentially mechanical operations
of the courts").
264. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19.
265. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, §§ 906-909, 1986 Wash. Laws 1366-67
(insurance related provisions).
266. Scott v. Cascade Structures, 100 Wash. 2d 537, 545-46, 673 P.2d 179, 183 (1983)
(upholding comprehensive 1981 tort reform and products liability act); Casey v. Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 56 Wash. App. 749, 785 P.2d 484 (1990).
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make legislation extremely difficult, if not impossible."2 7
Accordingly, the legislature is allowed wide discretion in the
selection of bill titles and subject matter" and a constitutional
violation will be found only in those "rare cases" involving
"extreme and obvious violations of article II, section 19.1'269
In Smith v. Department of Insurance,27 ° the Florida
Supreme Court upheld a tort reform statute, including modifi-
cation of joint and several liability, against a similar "single
subject" state constitutional attack. The court recognized that
the area of tort liability and the objective of creating a stable
market for liability insurance were closely related.2 7 - As a
matter of "common sense," the court appreciated that tort
reform legislation had to address both matters in order to be
effective. 2
These conclusions apply with equal force to the legislation
enacted in 1986 by the Washington Legislature to deal with a
liability insurance crisis and to promote increased equity in the
tort liability system. These problems evolved together and
were properly addressed concurrently in a single bill. There is
certainly more than a "rational unity' 273 among the various
provisions of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, and it therefore is
valid under article II, section 19.
IX. CONCLUSION
The detractors of the Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986
are understandably hopeful that the Washington Supreme
Court's rejection of the damages cap provision 274 presages the
future fate of other controversial provisions in the Act. The
noneconomic damages cap, however, was a singular and dis-
tinct provision which was uniquely vulnerable to constitutional
attack because it imposed a somewhat arbitrary ceiling on
267. Casco Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 37 Wash. 2d 777, 788, 226 P.2d 235, 241
(1951) (quoting Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 275, 28 P. 520, (1891)).
268. See State Fin. Comm. v. O'Brien, 105 Wash. 2d 78, 80-81, 711 P.2d 993, 993-94
(1986).
269. Casey, 56 Wash. App. 749, 785 P.2d 484 (1990) (listing the "extreme and
obvious" cases in which violations of article II, § 19 were found).
270. 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
271. Id. at 1086-87.
272. Id.
273. See State v. Grisby, 97 Wash. 2d 493, 498-99, 647 P.2d 6, 9 (1982), cert denied,
459 U.S. 1211 (1983).
274. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, amended, 780 P.2d
260 (1989).
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recovery of damages. By contrast, the modification of joint and
several liability is a principled provision which reflects the
evolution of the modern tort liability system to one grounded
upon comparative fault. As such, while it may be subject to
criticism on policy grounds, it is not susceptible to challenge as
arbitrary or unreasonable.
Accordingly, the invalidation of the noneconomic damages
cap should and likely will turn out to represent, not the begin-
ning of the end for tort reform in Washington, but merely the
collapse of a single weak provision in what otherwise is a mile-
stone in the progression toward a pure system of comparative
fault among all parties in tort litigation. Foes of the Tort
Reform Act's modification of joint and several liability will
find section 4.22.070 a tougher nut to crack than the ill-starred
damages cap. Although certain provisions of tort reform pack-
ages enacted by various states, particularly ceilings on dam-
ages, have met uneven fates, courts in other jurisdictions have
uniformly found statutes revising or abolishing joint and sev-
eral liability to pass constitutional muster.275
There is, of course, room for debate about the particular
means by which this reform was accomplished by the legisla-
ture and whether section 4.22.070 should be revised and clari-
fied to better realize the provision's purpose.276 However, the
time had come to abandon the general rule of joint and several
liability. By adopting a rule of several liability and comparative
fault to govern in most instances of tortious injury, the legisla-
ture took a giant stride forward toward realization of the
touchstone principle that "the extent of fault should govern
the extent of liability.
' '2 7 7
It would be unfortunate if the obsolete former regime
275. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1465 (D.
Colo. 1989); Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d
585 (1988); Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Beeler v. Van
Cannon, 376 N.W.2d 628, 629-30 (Iowa 1985); Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d
486, 492 (Iowa 1985); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1989).
276. The legislature stated that the purposes of the reforms enacted were "to
create a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the
availability of insurance." Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws
1354. If revisions of the particular language or provisions of section 4.22.070 should
prove necessary in order to more fully realize these purposes, the petition for
amendment should be made to the people's representatives in the legislature, not
through the medium of a constitutional challenge in the courts.
277. See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 157, 646 P.2d 579,
583 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226,119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)).
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imposing the full burden of liability upon each individual
defendant regardless of the degree of fault were to be
exhumed now by judicial fiat. The provisions of the Washing-
ton Constitution offer no justification for disinterring the ener-
vated common law rule of joint and several liability from its
well-deserved and timely burial.
